The Decline of Online Piracy: How Markets - Not Enforcement - Drive Down Copyright Infringement by Quintais, João Pedro & Poort, Joost
American University International Law Review 
Volume 34 
Issue 4 Articles from the Fifth Global Congress 
on Intellectual Property and the Public 
Article 5 
2019 
The Decline of Online Piracy: How Markets - Not Enforcement - 
Drive Down Copyright Infringement 
João Pedro Quintais 
University of Amsterdam 
Joost Poort 
University of Amsterdam 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr 
 Part of the International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the Internet Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Quintais, João Pedro and Poort, Joost (2019) "The Decline of Online Piracy: How Markets - Not 
Enforcement - Drive Down Copyright Infringement," American University International Law Review: Vol. 34 
: Iss. 4 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol34/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews 
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
American University International Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University 
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
807
THEDECLINE OFONLINE PIRACY: HOW
MARKETS – NOTENFORCEMENT – DRIVE
DOWNCOPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
JOÃO PEDROQUINTAIS*AND JOOST POORT**
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................. 808
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ONLINE PIRACY RESEARCH811
A. THE EFFECT OFONLINE PIRACY ON SALES .................. 813
1. Different and Opposing Interactions Between Piracy
and Sales ............................................................. 816
2. Differences Among and Within Content Types and
Changes Over Time............................................. 818
3. Methodological Challenges ................................. 820
B. THE EFFECT OF ENFORCEMENT ONONLINE PIRACY ..... 822
1. Strategies Involving Legal Supply ....................... 822
2. Legal Action Against Individual File Sharers ...... 823
3. Legal Action Against Platforms that Accommodate
File Sharing......................................................... 825
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS....................................................... 828
A. LEGALBACKGROUND................................................. 828
B. RULES ON COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ........................ 833
1. Primary Liability for Online Activities ................ 833
a. Overview....................................................... 833
b. Areas of Legal Uncertainty............................ 840
* Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of
Amsterdam.
** Associate Professor, Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of
Amsterdam.
The authors wish to thank the participants of the 13th Annual Conference of the
European Policy for Intellectual Property Association, Berlin (2018), the 5th Global
Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, Washington D.C. (2018),
and the 1st Intellectual Property & Innovation Researchers in Asia Conference,
Kuala Lumpur (2019). The research for this article was funded by Google.
808 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [34:4
2. Intermediary or Secondary Liability .................... 841
a. Overview: Notion of Intermediary and Safe
Harbors.......................................................... 841
b. Areas of Legal Uncertainty............................ 846
C. ENFORCEMENTMEASURES ......................................... 848
1. Enforcement Measures Against Users ................. 849
a. Civil Enforcement ......................................... 849
b. Administrative Enforcement .......................... 850
c. Criminal Enforcement ................................... 853
2. Enforcement Measures Against Intermediaries .... 854
a. Civil Measures............................................... 854
b. Administrative Measures ............................... 857
c. Criminal Measures......................................... 858
3. Most Used and Effective Enforcement Measures. 859
D. CONCLUSIONS OF THE LEGALANALYSIS ..................... 863
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ............................................... 864
A. THEDEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL SALES ......................... 864
B. MAIN SURVEY FINDINGS............................................. 866
C. SHALL I BUY OR SHALL I PIRATE? THEDISPLACEMENT OF
LEGAL SALES ............................................................ 872
V. CONCLUSION................................................................ 874
I. INTRODUCTION
The ways in which consumers acquire music, films, series, books,
and games have changed radically over the last twenty years.1 Until
the turn of the twenty-first century, copyright-protected content was
bought primarily in the form of physical carriers such as CDs, DVDS
and printed books. Nowadays, an increasing amount of purely digital
content is acquired and experienced online. In recent years, it has
become possible to discern a second shift in consumption of content:
from ownership to access.2
1. This article is partly based on JOOST POORT ET AL., INST. FOR INFO. L.,
GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY 59-63 (July 2018) [hereinafter POORT ET AL.,
GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY]; JOÃO PEDRO QUINTAIS, INST. FOR INFO. L.,
GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT (July 2018)
[hereinafter QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT].
2. See AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP:
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, 1-13 (2016) (discussing the shift
from ownership to access).
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In the music industry, for instance, digital sales—downloads plus
subscription services—accounted for 54% of global revenues in 2017,
whereas physical formats were down to a 30% share.3 In that year,
streaming grew by 41% to account for 38% of total revenues, while
revenues from downloads declined by 21%.4 In the film industry, total
spending in Europe in 2016 on buying and renting video was €9.7
billion.5 Physical DVDs and Blu-ray discs accounted for €4.2 billion
of that, down by 18%, while digital video and video on demand grew
by 27% to €5.4 billion.6 The gaming industry has undergone a similar
shift toward digital sales and subscriptions. “Physical books have, so
far, been more resilient to digitisation; E-book adoption is increasing,
but the revenue share of e-books is no higher than 30% in any of the
markets examined in this article.”7
Unauthorized online content distribution—commonly referred to as
“online piracy”—has followed the same evolution as authorized
distribution of content: from physical carriers, via downloads, to
streaming.8 For both legal and illegal distribution and consumption of
content, these various channels coexist today to serve the preferences
of different consumers.
This article deals with the “acquisition and consumption of music,
films, series, books, and games through the various legal and illegal
channels that exist [today], in a set of [thirteen] countries across the
globe.”9 The article aims first to provide an overview of the rules on
liability for and enforcement of online copyright infringement in the
countries studied. The second aim is to provide factual information
about the state of authorized and unauthorized acquisition and
consumption of these types of content. The third aim is to assess the
underlying mechanisms and the link with enforcement measures and
3. INT’L FED’N PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT 2018 13
(2018) [hereinafter GLOBALMUSICREPORT 2018], https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/
GMR2018.pdf.
4. Id. at 11-13 (performance rights and synchronization rights were responsible
for the remaining 16%).
5. European Video Market 2017, INT’L VIDEO FED’N (2017), http://www.ivf-
video.org/new/index.php?category/Market-information.
6. Id.
7. POORT ET AL., GLOBALONLINE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 1, at 17.
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id. at 7. Software other than games, sports, and porn fall outside the scope of
this article.
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legal supply. The final aim is to assess the effect of online piracy on
consumption from legal sources.
To these ends, we have carried out research that combines different
sources and empirical methods. We have conducted consumer surveys
among nearly 35.000 respondents, including over 7.000 minors, in
thirteen countries: seven European Union (EU) member states
(France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and United
Kingdom), two American countries (Brazil and Canada), and four
Asian regions and countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, and
Thailand).10 The results of these surveys have been combined with
comparative legal research based on a questionnaire concerning
copyright legislation and enforcement, completed by legal experts in
each of the countries.11 In addition, country data has been obtained
from the World Bank, and the resulting data set has been analysed
using state of the art econometric techniques. With regard to the
European countries studied, a comparable consumer survey was
conducted for all such countries in 2014 and for the Netherlands only
in 2012. Revisiting the countries in those reports allows for studying
developments in content consumption for these countries over time. It
also provides the unique opportunity to follow more than 4.000
respondents in seven countries over a longer time span.12
This article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we provide a brief
10. Id. at 17-18 (noting that data collection for these surveys was conducted by
SSI (all 13 countries) and CentERdata (the Netherlands)).
11. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. The questionnaire concerns the legal status of online
copyright infringement and enforcement under “national law”, a term that includes
statute and case law. The questions concern two interrelated aspects: substantive
legal rules and enforcement measures, procedures, remedies and sanctions.
12. MARTIN VAN DER ENDE ET AL., EUR. COMMISSION, ESTIMATING
DISPLACEMENT RATES OF COPYRIGHTED CONTENT IN THE EU, FINAL REPORT 7
(May 2015), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/59e
a4ec1-a19b-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. The authors conducted surveys
in France, Germany, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, to which
3,366 responded again in 2017. In an earlier report, Poort and Leenheer studied the
Netherlands, which is why a separate consumer survey was conducted by
CenterData, to also allow for a longitudinal analysis for the Netherlands for 986
respondents. Thus, a total of 4,352 respondents were followed over time. See JOOST
POORT & JORNA LEENHEER, INST. FOR INFO. L., FILE SHARING 2©12:
DOWNLOADING FROM ILLEGAL SOURCES IN THE NETHERLANDS, 3 (2012),
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/174.
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history of online piracy, discussing research on its effects, as well as
the effects of enforcement on piracy itself. In Part II, we present the
results of our legal comparative research in the thirteen jurisdictions
studied. This includes an examination of rules on primary liability and
secondary or intermediary liability for different online activities,
including downloading, streaming, stream-ripping and hyperlinking.
It also includes an analysis of the available arsenal of civil,
administrative and criminal enforcement measures in national laws
against users and intermediaries, combined with a discussion on the
use and effectiveness of these measures. Our analysis indicates that
the problem of piracy does not appear to be caused by a lack of
substantive rules imposing liability for unauthorized uses or even a
lack of enforcement measures. In Part III, we present the empirical
findings of our research. These relate to the development of legal sales,
the main outcomes of our consumer survey, and the effect of online
piracy on legal sales (i.e., its displacement rate).
Our main conclusion is that online piracy is declining. This decline
is linked primarily to increasing availability of affordable legal content
rather than enforcement measures. Where content is available at
affordable prices, in a convenient manner, and in sufficient diversity
to address demand, consumers are willing to pay for it. This has
significant policy implications, since it suggests that ongoing efforts
to tackle illegal content online through repressive measures are
misguided.13 Instead, it would make sense to direct resources towards
enabling better lawful access to affordable content.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ONLINE PIRACY
RESEARCH
The launch of Napster in 1999 is considered by many to be the start
of large-scale unauthorized online file sharing.14 Napster—a
13. See infra Part III (providing multiple illustrations of this trend, including the
creation of a piracy “watch list” in Europe); see generally European Commission,
Commission Staff Working Document: Counterfeit and Piracy Watch List 2 (July 12,
2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc_157564.pdf
(“In an innovation driven global economy, infringements of intellectual property
rights (IPR), in particular commercial scale counterfeiting and piracy, pose a major
problem for the European Union . . . IPR infringements must therefore be targeted
as a threat to the IPR-intensive industries and to the society at large.”).
14. See Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Andres Hervas-Drane, Competing
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legitimate for-pay music service since 2004—began as the first
globally used platform for exchanging music files without
authorization of copyright holders.15 This was two years before the
2001 launch of iTunes, the first platform to sell music digitally and per
track.16 After its shutdown in 2001, Napster was succeeded by many
technically more refined platforms and file sharing protocols such as
Morpheus, Gnutella, LimeWire, eMule and BitTorrent.17 Such
platforms and protocols generally do not store copyright-protected
content on a central server but facilitate direct peer-to-peer (“p2p”)
exchanges among users (peers) to avoid liability. 18 This exchange
started off with music, but, as soon as growing Internet bandwidth
allowed, films, series, and games followed suit.
A different technology, known as cyberlockers—such as
Megaupload (succeeded by Mega) and Rapidshare—make use of
cloud storage hosted at locations that aim to be out of reach of
copyright enforcement.19 Just like authorized supply via platforms
such as Spotify and Netflix, illegal supply expanded to streaming more
recently, enabling users to enjoy music, films and series without
permanently downloading them. Popcorn Time is a popular example
of such a service for films and series.20 In some cases, unauthorized
streaming is done via dedicated technical devices/set-top boxes with
Against Online Sharing, 48 MGMT. DECISION 1247, 1247 (2010).
15. See ROBIN JEWELER, CON. RES, SERV., RL30683, COPYRIGHT CASES IN THE
COURTS: NAPSTER, MP3 DIGITALMUSIC, ANDDVDMOTION PICTURE ENCRYPTION
TECHNOLOGY 9 (Feb. 16, 2001) (stating that almost all of Napster’s users
downloaded or uploaded unauthorized, copyrighted music).
16. See Apple Introduces iTunes – World’s Best and Easiest to Use Jukebox
Software, APPLE: NEWSROOM (Jan. 9, 2001), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/
2001/01/09Apple-Introduces-iTunes-Worlds-Best-and-Easiest-To-Use-Jukebox-
Software/ (introducing iTunes as a new and simpler way to download songs).
17. See Casadesus-Masanell & Hervas-Drane, supra note 14, at 1247.
18. See Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P in
the Decade after Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565 (2009).
19. Joe Mullin, How ‘Cyberblockers’ Became the Biggest Problem in Piracy,
GIGAOM (Jan. 20, 2011), https://gigaom.com/2011/01/20/419-how-cyberlockers-
became-the-biggest-problem-in-piracy/ (stating that these cyberblockers usually
offer some services for free and charge for premium accounts).
20. See Nick Whigham, Illegal Netflix-Style Popcorn Time Could Lead to
Trouble for Users, NEWS.COM.AU (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.news.com.au/
technology/online/piracy/illegal-netflixstyle-popcorn-time-could-lead-to-trouble-
for-users/news-story/e61d07b022e02b9cb9b5abc54e754320 (describing the
functionality of Popcorn Time and describing it as “the Netflix of piracy”).
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pre-installed links to unauthorized content platforms. A related use of
copyright-protected material generally qualified as unauthorized is
stream-ripping, whereby software tools, browser plugins or special
websites are used to store music or audio-visual content, such as
YouTube videos, offline for later replay, often in violation of the
service provider’s terms of service.21
This Part provides a brief overview the quantitative empirical
research into the link between online piracy and legal sales, as well as
the effect of various enforcement measures to combat online piracy.
A. THE EFFECT OFONLINE PIRACY ON SALES
When online file sharing took off around the turn of the century, the
recorded-music industry and, later, the film industry, were quick to
blame it for lost revenues. In 2000, for instance, the International
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) wrote, “[o]nline piracy
poses exactly the same threat as its physical equivalent to the creativity
of artists and the investment of record producers. Potentially its impact
is far greater than physical piracy.”22 And in a 2005 study for the
Motion Picture Association, LEK Consulting stated that “[p]iracy is
the biggest threat to the U.S. motion picture industry” and claimed that
in 2005 the major US studios lost $6.1 billion to piracy, 38% of which
took place online.23 This alarmist tone echoes the music industry’s
earlier response to the boom of private copying in the 1980s—‘home
taping is killing music’24—as well as the fear in the early 1950s that
radio airplay would hurt record sales.25
21. See Hugh McIntyre, What Exactly is Stream-Ripping, the New Way People
are Stealing Music, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
hughmcintyre/2017/08/11/what-exactly-is-stream-ripping-the-new-way-people-
are-stealing-music/#4eadcf111956.
22. INT’L FED’N PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI MUSIC PIRACY REPORT 2000
(2000), https://www.ifpi.org/content/library/Piracy2000.pdf.
23. L.E.K. CONSULTING, THE COST OF MOVIE PIRACY 3-4 (2015),
https://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/MPAA_US/M08013
0L.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Andrew J. Bottomley, ‘Home Taping is Killing Music’: The
Recording Industries’ 1980s Anti-Home Taping Campaigns and Struggles Over
Production, Labor and Creativity, 8 CREATIVE INDUS. J. 123, 133 (2015) (adding
that the attempt to criminalize home taping was ineffective because people believed
they had the moral high ground).
25. See Huseyin Leblebici et al., Institutional Change and the Transformation of
Interorganizational Fields: An Organizational History of the U.S. Radio
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As Internet connectivity and bandwidth grew, so did online piracy. 26
But more recently, there is evidence that online piracy is declining, at
least in some countries, since the advent of legal streaming services
such as Spotify and Netflix.27 On the other hand, a recent report by
piracy-tracking company MUSO claims that global piracy is at an all-
time high, after a 1.6% increase from 2016, due primarily to an
increase in demand for TV content (+3.4%) and music (14.7%) and
despite a decrease in demand for films (–2.3%).28 In a similar vein, a
study by PRS for Music and the UK Intellectual Property Office
recently reported an increase in stream-ripping by 141% between
January 2014 and September 2016, causing PRS for Music to call it
the “most aggressive form of music piracy.”29
Notwithstanding these statistics and the intricacies of establishing a
causal link between online piracy and legal sales to be discussed
below, it is largely undisputed that 1999 was a turning point for
revenues from global recorded music sales.30 Global revenues from
physical and digital recorded music sales declined by 42% in nominal
terms, from $25.2 to $14.6 billion between 1999 and 2014.31 Only
since 2015 has the global music market been growing again, to $17.3
Broadcasting Industry, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 333, 356 (1991) (describing how critical
air-play on the radio was to promoting sales, despite the fears of record companies).
26. See Tom Pritchard, Study Says Peer to Peer Piracy Isn’t Dying Off, It’s
Growing, GIZMODO UK (Aug. 9, 2018), http://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2018/08/study-
says-peer-to-peer-piracy-isnt-dying-off-its-growing/ (stating that P2P piracy
remains popular and that there has been a rise in streaming piracy).
27. See, e.g., Joost Poort & Jarst Weda, Elvis Is Returning to the Building:
Understanding a Decline in Unauthorized File Sharing, 28 J. MEDIAECON. 63, 66,
79 (2015) (stating that empirical academic literature on this decline in file sharing is
scarce); Telecompaper, Slechts 24 Porcent Nederlanders doet nog aan Gratis
Downloaden, Feb. 22, 2018, https://www.telecompaper.com/nieuws/slechts-24-
procent-nederlanders-doet-nog-aan-gratis-downloaden--1233037.
28. Global Piracy Increases Throughout 2017, MUSO Reveals, MUSO (2017),
https://www.muso.com/magazine/global-piracy-increases-throughout-2017-muso-
reveals. But see Michael Geist, The Case Against the Bell Coalition’s Website
Blocking Plan, Part 2: Weak Evidence on the State of Canadian Piracy, MICHAEL
GEIST (Feb. 13, 2018), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/02/case-bell-coalitions-
website-blocking-plan-part-2-weak-evidence-state-canadian-piracy/ (questioning
the validity of the MUSO data and suggesting the numbers are inflated).
29. Stream-ripping takes over as most aggressive form of music piracy increases
141%, PRS FORMUSIC (July 7, 2017), https://prsformusic.com/press/2017/stream-
ripping-takes-over-as-most-aggressive-form-of-music-piracy.
30. See GLOBALMUSIC REPORT 2018, supra note 3, at 10.
31. Id. at 11.
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billion in 2017.32 North American real video revenues (exclusive of
box office) continued to grow until 2004, then levelled off and
declined between 2005 and 2010.33
Nevertheless, the empirical question of the effect of unauthorized
online content consumption on legal sales has proven to be
cumbersome. In past years, a substantial body of academic literature
emerged on the effect of the unauthorized sharing of copyrighted
works, but no general consensus was reached. Most of the earlier
contributions focus on the music industry.34 A smaller number of
studies deal with the effect for films. 35
In literature reviews, it is observed that there are very few studies
concerning other markets, such as games, books and software.36 Smith
32. Id.
33. Stan J. Liebowitz, Internet Piracy: The Estimated Impact On Sales, in
HANDBOOK ON THE DIGITAL CREATIVE ECONOMY 262, 265 (Ruth Towse &
Christian Handke ed., 2013).
34. See, e.g., id. at 265-66 (discussing results from academic studies on whether
file-sharing led to a decline in sound recording sales or movie revenues); Felix
Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales:
An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 3 (2007) (rejecting the idea that file
sharing has an extreme effect on record sales); Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck,
The Effect of Internet Piracy on Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence, 1 REV. ECON.
RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 71, 71 (2004) (stating that many people believe that internet
piracy has reduced sales of CDs and that illegal MP3 downloads are substituting
legal purchases); Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C’s: Music
Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College
Students, 49 J.L. & ECON. 29, 29-30 (2006) (focusing on the effect of downloading
on sales and welfare); Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on
Music Purchases, 49 J.L. & ECON. 63, 63 (2006) (focusing on the decline of the
global music industry since its high level success in the 1990s).
35. See David Bounie et al., Piracy and the Demand for Films: Analysis of
Piracy Behavior in French Universities, 3 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 15,
16 (2006) (stating how only a few economic studies focus on movie piracy when
compared to music piracy); Thorsten Hennig-Thurau et al., Consumer File Sharing
of Motion Pictures, 71 J. MARKETING 1, 1 (2007) (describing the lack of evidence
regarding the effect of file sharing on movie consumption); Rafael Rob & Joel
Waldfogel, Piracy on the Silver Screen, 55 J. INDUS. ECON. 379, 381-82 (2007)
(finding the effect of piracy on movie revenues is limited).
36. See Christian Handke, Taxonomy of Empirical Research on Copyright –
How Do We Inform Policy, 9 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 47, 63-64 (2012)
(noting a lack of clarity about the effect of piracy on different copyright industries);
Michael D. Smith & Rahul Telang, Assessing the Academic Literature Regarding
the Impact of Media Piracy on Sales (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132153
(providing a “‘non-technical’ discussion of what academic literature in economics,
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and Telang conclude that “the vast majority of the literature . . . finds
evidence that piracy harms media sales.”37 However, most of this
evidence suggests a much smaller effect than a one-to-one
displacement of sales by illegal copies, and quantitative estimates vary
substantially. In a meta-analysis of the empirical literature up until
2013, Hardy, Krawczyk, and Tyrowic write:
In total, for the final analysis we have identified as many as 40 studies (with
more than 600 estimates) of which 4 argue in favor of a positive effect of
‘piracy’ on sales, 21 demonstrating the opposite, 6 finding no relationship
whatsoever and 5 finding the direction of the link dependent on the type of
content or analyzed sample. In addition, in most of the papers, at least some
of the specifications were insignificant.38
Thus, a democratic vote would yield a narrow majority for a
negative effect. But in a more rigorous meta-analysis, the authors of
that study conclude that as a whole, the literature fails to reject the
hypothesis of no effects on sales.39 In other words, an effect cannot be
proven beyond reasonable statistical doubt.
1. Different and Opposing Interactions Between Piracy and Sales
How can it be that this relationship between unauthorized
consumption of works and sales, which seems obvious at first glance,
is so elusive and hard to establish in practice? A likely explanation is
that closer scrutiny paints a more diverse picture. Unauthorized
distribution and consumption of works can affect legal consumption
in several different ways, some of which have a negative impact on
sales, some positive and some neutral. These various potential
mechanisms are summarized in Table 1.
marketing, and information systems can tell us about how piracy impacts sales of
media products”); Steven James Watson et al., Determinants of Unlawful File
Sharing: A Scoping Review, 10 PLOSONE 1, 2 (2015) (resorting to “grey literature,”
not published in academic journals, to determine the effects of unlawful file sharing
on various industries).
37. Smith & Telang, supra note 36.
38. Wojciech Hardy et al., Friends or Foes? A Meta-Analysis of the Link
Between “Online Piracy” and Sales of Cultural Goods 2 (Univ. Warsaw Fac. Econ.
Sci. Working Paper No. 23, 2015).
39. Id. at 1.
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Table 1 Possible effects of online piracy on the purchase of legal content40
Positive + It introduces consumers to music, films, books and games (and to artists,
authors and genres), thus creating new demand. This is known as the
sampling effect.
+ It allows consumers to pool their demand, resulting in increased demand.
+ It enhances willingness to pay and demand for concerts and related
merchandise (complementary demand).
+ It enhances the popularity of products, boosting demand for legal supply
(network effect).
Neutral o It meets the demand of consumers who are not, or not sufficiently, willing
to pay and subsequently are not served by legal supply.
o It meets a demand for products that are not offered legally.
Negative - It substitutes for the purchase of content or cinema visits (substitution
effect).
- It results in the deferred purchase of content at a lower price than the price
at launch.
- Sampling results in sales displacement as a result of fewer bad purchases.
- It substitutes legal consumption via consumers’ time budget.
The most prominent positive effect is known as the sampling effect,
in which consumers are introduced to new music, actors, and genres
and this creates new demand.41 Online piracy may also enhance the
demand for complementary products such as live concerts and
merchandise42 and increase the popularity of content; this is known as
the network effect.43
On the downside, the most prominent effect is obviously
substitution: a consumer refrains from buying specific content legally
after having acquired or consumed it from an illegal source.44 Other
40. POORT ET AL., GLOBALONLINE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 1, at 25.
41. Hardy et al., supra note 38, at 4 (adding that the benefits of the low-cost
version could be provided by the producers themselves, like the “freemium”
business model in Spotify).
42. See Ralf Dewenter et al., On File Sharing with Indirect Network Effects
Between Concert Ticket Sales and Music Recordings 25 J. MEDIA ECON. 168, 176
(2012) (clarifying that increased concert ticket demand can be a result of file sharing
if indirect network effects are sufficiently strong); Jule Holland Mortimer et al.,
Supply Responses to Digital Distribution: Recorded Music and Live Performances
24 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 3, 4 (2012) (providing more details about the two types of
effects recorded music file sharing has on live concert performances – demand shifts
and supply shifts).
43. See, e.g., Dewenter et al., supra note 42, at 169 (using the indirect network
effects of the Harry Potter books on the movies and vice versa).
44. Hardy et al., supra note 38, at 6.
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negative effects on sales occur when sampling leads to fewer bad buys
or deferred purchases at lower prices.45 Lastly, “piracy may displace
legal consumption via competition for people’s time budget: if one
watches a film illegally, one cannot watch a film legally at the same
time.”46
“Neutral effects with respect to sales occur when file sharing meets
the demand of consumers with insufficient willingness to pay,
consumers who have demand for a work that is not on offer, or for a
work in a specific technical quality or file type that is not legally
available.”47
2. Differences Among and Within Content Types and Changes Over
Time48
Against the background of the ten different possible interactions in
Table 1, it is less of a surprise that the findings of empirical studies on
the relationships between online piracy and legal consumption of
content vary widely, ranging from positive to neutral to negative.
Moreover, the strength of the different interactions is likely to differ
among and within content types, and between occasional pirates and
heavy pirates. In top of that, it is likely to have changed over time.
One relevant difference between music and games, on the one hand,
and films, series and books, on the other hand, is that most people
enjoy the same music many times, whereas they watch a film or read
a book only once or twice. This implies that sampling is likely to be
more relevant for music—try before you buy—than for audio-visual
content and books. Also, the positive effect of piracy on the demand
for related products such as live concerts and merchandise may be
more significant for music, whereas the time budget effect is less
relevant as music is often enjoyed while doing other things at the same
time. All this suggests that net sales displacement is like to be higher
for films, series and books than for music. The position of games in
this spectrum is not obvious: it is likely that a fully functional game
45. POORT ET AL., GLOBALONLINE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 1, at 11.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id. at 24.
48. This Part II.A.2 is a direct quote from POORT ET AL., GLOBAL ONLINE
PRIVACY STUDY, supra note 1, at 25-26. Additional sources have been provided for
further support.
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from an illegal source displaces demand for a legal version, but the
gaming industry has more technical possibilities to ensure that an
illegal version is not a perfect substitute—for instance, because it does
not allow for periodic updates.
The strength of the different effects also varies within content types:
the sampling effect is likely to be weaker for famous artists and
blockbuster films from which consumers generally know what to
expect. Moreover, popular and recent content is more likely to be on
offer legally, whereas older and niche content may be unavailable or
out of commerce. If so, consumption of such content from illegal
sources cannot displace legal acquisition for that specific title. This
effect is likely to be stronger in countries such as Thailand, Indonesia
and Hong Kong, where not all major legal platforms are available.
Watson, Zizzo, and Fleming mention the long-tail distribution of
pirated content, and the net displacement effect may be different
further down this tail than in the head of the distribution.49 Indeed,
some studies find indications that more popular musicians and
albums50 and blockbuster films51 suffer more from the substitution
effect, whereas less-well-known productions may even benefit as the
opposing sampling effect prevails. However, other studies find an
opposite effect.52
Lastly, the relevance of the interactions in Table 1 has changed over
time. In the early days of illegal file sharing, music was available only
on physical carriers, bundled in albums. Consumers who only wanted
a specific song were not served. Likewise, audio-visual content was
tied to DVDs locked with technical protection measures. This situation
has changed dramatically, and nowadays most popular content is
available not only on physical carriers but also as digital downloads
49. Id. at 25-26; seeWatson et al., supra note 36, at 11.
50. See David Blackburn, On-line Piracy and Recorded Music Sales (Harv. U.
Dep’t Econ., Working Paper, 2004); Mortimer, supra note 41, at 8.
51. See Christian Peukert et al., Piracy and Box Office Movie Revenues:
Evidence from Megaupload, 52 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 188, 189-91 (2017).
52. See Sudip Bhattacharjee et al., The Effect of Digital Sharing Technologies on
Music Markets: A Survival Analysis of Albums on Ranking Charts, 53 MANG’T SCI.
1359, 1362 (2007) (finding that file sharing has a negative impact on low-ranked
albums); Robert Hammond, Profit Leak? Pre-Release File Sharing and the Music
Industry, 81 S. ECON. J. 387, 405, 406 (2013) (explaining that file-sharing, the
unauthorized sharing of sound recording, disproportionately benefits established and
popular artists because it generates public anticipation for the album).
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and via streaming services. In addition, film trailers and music videos
are generally available for free via platforms such as YouTube. And
Spotify, for instance, offers a free ad-sponsored music streaming
service.
Such developments have reduced the incentive to turn to illegal
sources for sampling or for specific technical formats that are not on
offer via legal channels. It seems plausible that this has reduced piracy,
indeed what Poort and Weda concluded in 2015 for the illegal
consumption of music concurrent with the rise of legal music
streaming.53 The authors also suggest that the net displacement rate of
the remaining piracy may be higher as the positive sampling effect and
the neutral effect of unmatched demand lose their relevance.
Moreover, as many consumers lost interest in ‘owning’ content on
CDs and DVDs, they became less likely to buy a physical carrier after
sampling a digital file. For instance, in the Netherlands, this proved to
be fairly common in 2008, but much less so by 2012: in 2008, 63% of
music pirates and 48% of film pirates did this at least once in the
preceding year, whereas four years later these rates had dropped to
20% and 23%, respectively. 54On the other hand, by now the remaining
pirates may be the ones with the lowest purchasing power or
willingness to pay.
3. Methodological Challenges55
A last, but no less important, explanation for the unequivocal
outcomes of empirical studies are the methodological challenges
involved. Put simply, one cannot just compare the legal and illegal
music or film consumption of individuals and conclude that the
observed correlation is causal. Several studies have shown that legal
and illegal consumption go hand in hand and that on average, people
who consume from illegal sources are the content industry’s largest
customers.56 The underlying reason is that people who are more
interested in music, films, series, books or games tend to consume
53. See Poort & Weda, supra note 27, at 81.
54. See POORT&LEENHEER, supra note 12.
55. This Part II.A.3 is a direct quote from POORT ET AL., GLOBAL ONLINE
PRIVACY STUDY, supra note 1, at 26-27. Additional sources have been provided for
further support.
56. See Nico van Eijk et al., Legal, Economic and Cultural Aspects of File
Sharing, 77 COMM. & STRAT. 35, 44 (2010).
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more via any available channel, leading to a positive correlation
between consumption from illegal and legal channels.
This means that empirical studies that observe individual
consumption need to control for such individual differences as much
as possible. The easiest way to do that in a survey is to ask individuals
how much of a music, film, book or game aficionado they are. But
even controlling for this, there are remaining unobserved individual
characteristics that tend to induce a positive correlation. Several
studies use a so-called instrumental variable approach to resolve this
issue. The aim in this approach is to look for variables that correlate
with consumption from illegal sources but that affect consumption
from legal sources only through the former.
Earlier studies used instruments related to Internet availability and
speed or individual Internet skills.57 That may have been a valid
approach when content consumption via the Internet was almost
synonymous with consumption from illegal sources, but clearly, today
that can no longer be maintained. Indeed, in the current survey it is
observed that such variables tend to correlate strongly and positively
with consumption from both legal and illegal channels as people need
to have Internet access and Internet skills for both, making them
unsuitable as instrumental variables. Our study uses a different
instrument related not to Internet aptitude or availability but to moral
attitudes toward activities such as jaywalking, taking a flash photo in
a museum and travelling on public transit without a ticket.58 In
addition, this study uses panel data analysis to control for unobserved
individual characteristics.59
A related complexity is that both legal and illegal content supply
have changed and diversified over time. To legally consume recorded
music, for instance, one can buy a CD, rent it or borrow it from a
library, purchase a digital file (e.g., on Apple Music), or use a
streaming service such as Spotify. There are also different channels
for illegal consumption now. As mentioned in the introduction, the
57. See Zentner, supra note 34, at 63; see alsoOberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, supra
note 34, at 3-4; Godefroy Dang Nguyen et al., Are Streaming and Other Music
Consumption Modes Substitutes or Complements?, 7 (2012),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2025071.
58. See POORT ET AL., GLOBALONLINE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 1, at 71-75;
VAN DER ENDE ET AL., supra note 12, at 7.
59. See POORT ET AL., GLOBALONLINE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 1, at 75-80.
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market as a whole has shifted from physical carriers via downloads to
streams. This implies that it is dangerous to interpret developments per
channel in isolation: legal consumption via one channel cannibalizes
consumption via another. Put differently, a decrease in CD purchases
may be due to legal downloads and streams as well as to online piracy.
Ideally, one would estimate the effect of consumption via all illegal
channels on all legal channels. This involves making assumptions
about how to add streams, downloads and physical carriers.60
B. THE EFFECT OF ENFORCEMENT ONONLINE PIRACY
The entertainment industry has pursued different strategies to
combat unauthorized file sharing throughout the years. The discussion
below focuses on empirical studies on the effect of such strategies.
The legal aspects of these strategies are addressed in Part II.
1. Strategies Involving Legal Supply
Some of the entertainment industry’s strategies to tackle online
piracy focus on the supply side. A good illustration is the attempt to
prevent users from exchanging legally acquired content through the
deployment of Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology.61 This
approach has been reinforced legally in the WIPO Treaties, and to
varying extents, in the national laws of all countries reflecting efforts
to prevent circumvention of technological protection measures and
rights management information in international law.62 However, this
strategy proved to be counterproductive for CDs and digital music
downloads, and has been mostly abandoned.63 Nevertheless, DRM is
still commonly used for streaming services, audio-visual products, e-
books, and games.64
Another tactic is to offer legal digital alternatives. In a study
regarding the effect of the removal of NBC content from the iTunes
store in December 2007 and the subsequent restoration of this content
60. See id. at 44-46.
61. Id. at 27.
62. See id. at 27–28.
63. See Rajiv K. Sinha et al., Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right: Music Piracy
and Pricing in a DRM-Free Environment, 74 J. MKT. 40, 41 (2010); see also Dinah
A. Vernik et al.,Music Downloads and the Flip Side of Digital Rights Management,
30 MKT. SCI. 1011, 1016-17 (2011).
64. See Vernik et al., supra note 63, at 1011.
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in September 2008 on BitTorrent piracy and DVD sales on Amazon,
the authors associate the removal of content with an 11.4% increase in
piracy of this content. This amounts to twice the legal digital sales
made prior to removal.65 There were no significant effects on DVD
sales or on piracy levels found after the content was restored.66 A later
study similarly observes a decrease in online music piracy in the
Netherlands between 2008 and 2012, while unauthorized consumption
of films and TV content almost doubled.67 The authors link these
opposite trends to the emergence of adequate legal services for
downloading and streaming music (in particular Spotify) but the
absence (at that time) of equally satisfactory services for audio-visual
content.68
Finally, a more controversial strategy involves the pollution or
poisoning of illegal file sharing networks with useless decoys.69
2. Legal Action Against Individual File Sharers
Legal action and enforcement against unauthorized sources can be
distinguished by action against individual file sharers, or the demand
side of the illegal market, and action against the supply side, the
platforms that accommodate unauthorized file sharing.
In June 2003, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) sued countless individual file sharers.70 Research tracking the
online file sharing behavior of over 2,000 individuals found that in
reaction to these lawsuits, the majority of substantial file sharers
decreased the number of files shared typically by 90% and small-time
file sharers typically by two-thirds.71 However, the individuals who
65. Brett Danaher et al., Converting Pirates Without Cannibalizing Purchasers:
The Impact of Digital Distribution on Physical Sales and Internet Piracy, 29 MKT.
SCI. 1138, 1139 (2010).
66. Id.
67. See Poort & Weda, supra note 27, at 79-81.
68. See id.
69. See Nicolas Christin et al., Content Availability, Pollution and Poisoning in
File Sharing Peer-to-Peer Networks, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6THACMCONFERENCE
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1 (2005) (explaining that a particularly popular technique
in preventing the distribution of copyrighted material in peer-to-peer file sharing
networks is called ‘poisoning,’ which is done by injecting a massive number of
decoys into the peer-to-peer network to reduce the availability of the targeted item).
70. See Bhattacharjee et al., supra note 52, at 1364.
71. See id. at 1370-71.
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continued unauthorized file sharing increased their activity again after
a court ruling that made it harder for the RIAA to request the names
of file sharers from internet service providers (ISPs).72 Furthermore,
the authors of that study note that individuals may have gone off the
radar, using more covert file-sharing technologies.73
A separate study looked into the effects of implementation of the
EU Enforcement Directive into Swedish law on music and film sales. 74
The authors found an 18% drop in Internet traffic during the six
months following implementation.75 Using difference-in-difference
analysis with Finland and Norway as controls, they concluded that the
implementation led to an increase in sales of physical music by 27%
and digital music by 48%.76 No significant effects were found on
cinema visits or DVD sales.77 However, it was also shown that “the
reform effects more or less disappeared after six months except for
digital music sales.”78 This data suggests that it was primarily the
publicity and awareness campaigns around the new legislation that
caused a temporary effect. The authors also reported the outcome of
two consumer surveys on file sharing. In 2009, 23% of the survey
respondents stated that they had stopped using file-sharing sites as a
result of the new legislation, and 37% used file-sharing sites less.79 In
2010, 52% stated they used file-sharing sites less for downloading
music than they had the year before.80 In the group who reported
downloading less than the year before, 56% reported Spotify and 25%
‘better legal services’ as the reason for this, and 34% mentioned the
72. See id. at 1371.
73. See id.; Annemarie Bridy,Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P
in the Decade after Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 604 (2009).
74. See Adrian Adermon & Che-Yan Liang, Piracy, Music and Movies: A
Natural Experiment 5 (Research Inst. Indus. Econ., IFN Working Paper No. 854,
2010), http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp854.pdf (finding that the “Swedish
implementation of the European Union directive IPRED on April 1, 2009 suddenly
increased the risk of being caught and prosecuted for file sharing”, and concluding
that “pirated music is a strong substitute for legal music whereas the suitability is
less for movies”).
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id. at 20-21.
80. Id.
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Enforcement Directive.81
Danaher et al. studied the effect of the French HADOPI legislation
on digital sales in the iTunes store (described infra).82Under this ‘three
strikes’ legislation, implemented in October 2009, infringers first
receive a warning.83 When caught again, they get a second warning;
then, suspension of their Internet connection may be ordered.84 The
authors used a difference-in-difference approach when comparing
French data with other countries, and found a positive effect on song
and album sales at iTunes of 22.5% and 25%, respectively.85However,
it is impossible to separate the effects of the legislation itself from the
effect of the education campaigns accompanying the introduction of
HADOPI. Most of the effect seems to have arisen before the
(amended) legislation was finally accepted by the Constitutional
Council in October 2009 and diminished since then.86 However,
HADOPI is increasing the number of cases it brings to court and the
“three million e-mails and 330,000 notice letters that the committee
sent between 2010 and 2014 appear to have caused a reduction in
online copyright infringement.”87
3. Legal Action Against Platforms that Accommodate File Sharing
Adistinct strategic option is to focus on the supply side of the illegal
market by enforcing copyright against online platforms that enable or
facilitate the file-sharing. The most direct way to do this is to shut
down platforms and websites that host or direct to illegal content.
However, this may be problematic if the platform is outside the
jurisdiction of enforcement. Also, a platform that is taken down may
quickly re-emerge elsewhere or be succeeded. An early example of
this was the shutdown of Napster in July 2001.88 As mentioned above,
Napster was quickly replaced by next generation platforms (e.g.,
81. Id.
82. Brett Danaher et al., The Effect of Graduated Response Anti-Piracy Laws on
Music Sales: Evidence from an Event Study in France, J. INDUS. ECON. 2 (2013).
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id. at 9.
87. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 86.
88. Id. See generally Brad King Gear, The Day Napster Died, WIRED (May 15,
2002), https://www.wired.com/2002/05/the-day-the-napster-died/.
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KaZaA and BitTorrent clients) whose main characteristic was to
increasingly, “decentralize the file-sharing process. The bootstrapping
of the process occurs at sites such as [The Pirate Bay].”89
A later example is provided by the shutdown of Megaupload in
January 2012, the most popular cyberlocker in the world.90 Danaher
and Smith studied the effects of its shutdown on unauthorized file
sharing and legal online film rentals and purchases, examining cross-
country variation in the use of Megaupload before the shutdown and
the change in legal sales afterwards.91 No relationship was found
between the penetration of Megaupload and digital sales prior to the
shutdown.92 But a significant positive relationship was found between
this penetration and the change in legal sales after the shutdown. For
each additional 1% of Megaupload penetration before the shutdown,
sales increased by an extra 2.5–3.3% after the website was closed. The
fact that before the shutdown, no relationship was found between
Megaupload penetration and digital sales suggests that the effect of
enforcement is temporary and lasts until consumers have found
alternative suppliers of illegal video content. A different study on the
effect of the Megaupload shutdown found that it had a negative effect
on box-office revenues for smaller and mid-range films.93 Only
blockbusters benefited from the shutdown, whereas smaller films may
have benefited more from file sharing through word-of-mouth on
social networks. Overall, the effect found was not statistically
significant.94
Subsequent research on the effect of legal actions against
cyberlockers, such as content removal, found that such actions are a
nuisance to users but that their effect on overall availability of content
and on file-sharing activity is limited.95 The conclusion was that
89. Poort et al., Baywatch: Two Approaches to Measure the Effects of Blocking
Access to The Pirate Bay, 38 TELECOMM. POL’Y 383, 385 (2014) [hereinafter Poort
el al., Baywatch].
90. Id. at 386.
91. See Brett Danaher & Michael D. Smith, Gone In 60 Seconds: The Impact of
The Megaupload Shutdown on Movie Sales, 33 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1, 2 (2014).
92. Poort et al., Baywatch, supra note 89, at 386.
93. See Peukert et al., supra note 51, at 189.
94. Poort et al., Baywatch, supra note 89, at 386.
95. See Tobias Lauinger et al., Clickonomics: Determining the Effect of Anti-
Piracy Measures for One-Click Hosting, 1 (2013), http://wp.internetsociety.org/
ndss/wp-content/uploads/sites/25/2017/09/07_1_0.pdf.
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cyberlockers “are probably most vulnerable to antipiracy measures
targeted at removing external sources of revenue. Indexing sites may
be less affected, especially those that are less driven by (and reliant
on) monetary gain.”96
Along the same lines, a study on the effect of the shutdown of an
unauthorized video-streaming website (kino.to) in Germany
concluded that “[t]his intervention was not very effective in reducing
unlicensed consumption or encouraging licensed consumption, mainly
because users quickly switch to alternative unlicensed sites.”97
Moreover, it observed that after the shutdown, the unlicensed market
became more fragmented, making it more resilient to subsequent
interventions.98
An alternative approach being applied in an increasing number of
countries, particularly in Europe, is blocking access to infringing
websites.99 As noted below, in most countries website blocking
requires a court order or at least follows an administrative procedure,
so as to avoid chilling effects and over-blocking of websites
containing both infringing and non-infringing content, or content of
unclear legal status.100 There are different technical means of blocking
access,101 but the key element is that blocking can be done nationally
or at the level of an Internet provider, without taking down the
platform that is offering or directing to unauthorized content. Thus,
jurisdiction is less of an obstacle. Research shows that blocking access
to individual websites has little or no effect on consumption from
illegal channels, as people can easily circumvent the blocking
injunction or move to alternative websites.102 On the other hand, there
is evidence that simultaneously blocking a large number of websites
in the UK had a statistically significant negative effect on total online
piracy and a positive effect on the use of legal video streaming
96. Id. at 12.
97. Luis Aguiar et al., Catch Me if You Can: Effectiveness and Consequences of
Online Copyright Enforcement, 29 INFO. SYS. RES. 656, 656 (2018).
98. See Lauinger et al., supra note 95, at 12.
99. Nigel Cory, How Website Blocking Is Curbing Digital Piracy Without
“Breaking the Internet”, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION F. 12 (2016),
http://www2.itif.org/2016-websiteblocking.pdf?_ga=2.12071156.1138118272.155
0381679-1951500325.1550381679.
100. See infra Part III.
101. See Cory, supra note 99, at 8-11, 18.
102. Poort et al., Baywatch, supra note 89, at 387.
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platforms.103
Other approaches to combating the supply of unauthorized content
may involve cutting off revenue streams of infringing websites by
persuading advertisers and credit card companies to boycott them,
removing such websites from search results, and removing infringing
apps from app stores.104
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
This Part of the article contains the legal findings of our
comparative research in the thirteen jurisdictions investigated. After a
brief legal background, we explore national rules on primary and
intermediary liability for different online activities, including
downloading, streaming, stream-ripping, and hyperlinking. We then
we examine the available arsenal of civil, administrative, and criminal
enforcement measures in national laws against users and
intermediaries, including a discussion on the use and effectiveness of
such measures. We conclude that the problem of piracy does not
appear to be caused by a lack of substantive rules imposing liability
for unauthorized use or a dearth of enforcement measures.
A. LEGALBACKGROUND
Copyright law is substantially harmonized by international law,
which sets out basic rules and minimum standards on substantive
copyright law and enforcement. The most relevant international
treaties and conventions in copyright law are the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the 1994 Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (TRIPS) and,
in relation to use over digital networks, the 1996 WIPO Treaties on
103. See Brett Danaher et al., Website Blocking Revisited: The Effect of the UK
November 2014 Blocks on Consumer Behavior, 4 (Apr. 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2766795.
104. See Andrew Weinstein, Study Shows Ad Industry Anti-Piracy Efforts Have
Cut Pirate Ad Revenue In Half, TAG (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.tagtoday.net/
pressreleases/study-shows-ad-industry-anti-piracy-efforts-have-cut-pirate-ad-
revenue-in-half; Matt Southern, Google Asked to Remove Over a Million Websites
for Copyright Infringement, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.searchenginejournal.com/google-asked-remove-million-websites-
copyright-infringement/185867/#close.
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Copyright (WCT) and Performances and Phonograms (WPPT).105
The EU member states examined in this article are party to all
international agreements. The EU as an organization is a member of
TRIPS and theWIPO Treaties, making them binding on its institutions
and member states.106 All countries studied herein are party to Berne
and to the latest amended version of TRIPS. Most countries are party
to the WIPO Treaties, with the exception of Brazil and Thailand,
which are not members of either.107
Berne sets out minimum standards regarding inter alia the
protection of works and the rights of authors.108 TRIPS sets out
minimum standards concerning the availability, scope and use of
intellectual property rights, including copyright and related rights. 109
The minimum standards include protected subject matter, rights
conferred, and permissible exceptions or limitations to those rights.110
Regarding copyright, TRIPS incorporates by reference most
substantive provisions of the latest version of Berne, making them
obligations under TRIPS as between its members.111 Furthermore,
TRIPS includes obligations regarding subject matter and rights not
105. See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention] (noting that the agreement is premised on”[t]he countries of the Union,
being equally animated by the desire to protect, in as effective and uniform a manner
as possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”); Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (discussing the parties’ desire to “reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade . . . [promote] adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and [] ensure the measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers ot legitimate trade”); WIPO
Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 [hereinafter WCT]; WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 1996 O.J. (L 89) [hereinafter WPPT].
106. The WIPO Treaties were approved on behalf of the European Community
by Council Decision 2000/278/EC. Council Decision 2000/278/EC, art. 1, 2000 O.J.
(L 89) 6.
107. Summary Table of Membership of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and the Treaties Administered by WIPO, Plus UPOV, WTO
and UN, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp (last visited Feb. 17,
2019) (providing the different texts of these conventions and current lists of
contracting states).
108. Berne Convention, supra note 105, arts. 3-6 bis.
109. TRIPS, supra note 105, arts. 1-40.
110. Id. arts. 9-14.
111. Id. art. 9(1) (incorporating articles 1-21 of Berne, except article 6 bis).
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covered by Berne.112 Unlike Berne, TRIPS also includes rules on
enforcement procedures and subjects disputes between members
concerning these obligations to WTO dispute settlement
procedures.113
The WIPO Treaties adapt copyright and related rights to the digital
age. The WCT is a special agreement under Berne, incorporating by
reference most of its substantive provisions and adding protected
subject matter and substantive rights to the international minimum
standards.114 Among the features of this treaty is the recognition of a
broad reproduction right with application to the digital environment,
and a general right of communication to the public, including a
“making available” prong covering interactive and on-demand use of
digital content.115 The WPPT likewise extends to the digital age the
standards of protection of the 1961 Rome Convention, including the
recognition of a making available right for performers and phonogram
producers.116 Both WIPO Treaties recognize in addition legal
protection against the circumvention of technological protection
measures (TPMs) and rights management information.117 Both treaties
also include “light” provisions on enforcement of rights mandating
contracting parties to adopt measures to ensure application of the
treaties, although no specific measures are prescribed.118
Since over half of the countries examined are EU member states, it
is important to briefly set out the basic rules governing copyright in
the EU. EU law has been subject to a high level of harmonization
stemming from a large number of directives on copyright and related
rights, the interpretation of which is determined by the case law of the
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). This copyright acquis
communautaire often surpasses international minimum standards of
protection. For our purposes, the most relevant instruments are the
2001 InfoSoc Directive, the 2004 Enforcement Directive, and the
112. Id. arts. 10-11.
113. Id. arts. 41-64.
114. WCT, supra note 105, at arts. 1, 4-5.
115. Id. arts. 4, 8.
116. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, art. 7, 10, 13, Oct. 26, 1961, 496
U.N.T.S. 43; WTTP, supra note 105, at 17-18, arts. 7, 10, 13, 14.
117. SeeWTTP, supra note 105, art. 18; WCT, supra note 105, art. 11.
118. WCT, supra note 105, arts. 10-12, 14; WTTP, supra note 105, arts. 16, 18-
19.
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2000 E-Commerce Directive (or ECD).119
The InfoSoc Directive implements the WIPO Treaties into EU law
and adapts it to the information society.120 It recognizes exclusive
rights applicable to online use, namely reproduction and
communication to the public (including making available), as well as
number of exceptions or limitations to the same.121 The case law of the
CJEU traditionally interprets the exclusive rights broadly and the
exceptions strictly.122 Particularly important is its case law on the right
of communication to the public, which includes the consideration of
elements of knowledge and commerciality in the assessment of
primary liability.123
The directive further provides WCT/WPPT-”plus” legal protection
to TPM and rights management information against circumvention
and preparatory acts.124 It also includes a provision on sanctions and
remedies (implementing the WIPO Treaties), including a rule
obligating member states to ensure that rights holders can apply for
injunctions against intermediaries whose services are used by a third
party to infringe copyright, even if the intermediary is not itself
directly liable for infringement.125 This provision has played a
significant role in determining the liability of ISPs, and articulates the
liability exemptions for intermediaries in the ECD.126 In essence,
although national laws can determine the scope and procedures of
injunctive relief, they are generally limited inter alia by the operation
of fundamental rights recognized in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the EU (the Charter), leading to a fair balancing exercise.127
119. See Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167); Council Directive
2004/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 195); Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178).
N.B. the ECD is not strictly part of the EU copyright acquis.
120. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 119, at 10, 11 (Recital 15).
121. Id. at 16, 17, arts. 2-5.
122. See João Pedro Quintais, Untangling the Hyperlinking Web: In Search of the
Online Right of Communication to the Public, 21 J.WORLD INTELL. PROP. 385, 387-
88 (2018).
123. See id.; Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, Liability for Providing
Hyperlinks to Copyright-Infringing Content: International and Comparative Law
Perspectives, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153, 161-62 (2018).
124. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 119, at 17, 18, arts. 6-7.
125. Id. at 18, art. 8(3).
126. Id.; Council Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 119, arts. 12-15.
127. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 52, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 1, 21 (EC). Despite the Enforcement Directive generally regulating
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The Enforcement Directive implements TRIPS and applies to all
types of intellectual property rights.128 It deals exclusively with civil
enforcement measures, procedures, and remedies, including rules on
standing, injunctions (interlocutory and final), damages, and codes of
conduct for infringement.129
In EU law, there is no comprehensive harmonization of
intermediary liability. The ECD contains conditional liability
exemptions, or “safe harbors”, for certain types of intermediary
services involving claims for damages: mere conduit (or access),
caching, and hosting.130 The directive further contains a prohibition on
the imposition of “general” monitoring obligations on
intermediaries.131 Under this regime, intermediaries may still be
required to take measures against the infringement of copyright, since
it remains possible to subject intermediaries to injunctions (e.g., under
the InfoSoc Directive) and duties of care.132
In interpreting this constellation of provisions, the CJEU has noted
that safe harbors require a sufficient degree of “neutrality” from the
intermediary. This approach creates a grey area for the qualification
of certain web 2.0 platforms as “neutral”/”passive” or “active”
intermediaries for the purposes of the hosting safe harbor.133
Furthermore, it remains unclear what type of “specific”, as opposed to
“general” monitoring duties may be lawfully imposed on providers to
interlocutory injunctions against intermediaries, the regulation of such injunctions
for copyright infringement is dealt with by art. 8(3) InfoSoc Directive. On the CJEU
case law on fair balancing in the copyright field. See CHRISTINA ANGELOPOULOS,
EUROPEAN INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT: A TORT-BASED ANALYSIS
(2016).
128. Council Directive 2004/48/EC, supra note 119, at 19, arts. 1-2.
129. Id. at 19, 24, arts. 1, 16.
130. Council Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 119, at 12-13, arts. 12-15.
131. Id. at 12-13, arts. 12-15.
132. Id. at 6, 13, 14, arts. 13(2), 14(3), 18.
133. The approach finds its legal basis in Recital 42 ECD, according to which the
directive’s safe harbours are applicable only if the platform’s activities are of “a
mere technical, automatic and passive nature”. In its case law, the CJEU has applied
Art. 14 ECD to a search engine’s advertising service, an online sales platform, and
a social networking platform. See id. at 6; Joined Cases C-236/08, C237/08 & C-
238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417;
Case C-324/09, L’Oreal SA v. eBay International AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011; Case C-
360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA v.
Netlog NV, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 85 (Feb. 16, 2012).
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prevent infringement. CJEU case law has not sufficiently clarified
these uncertainties.134
B. RULES ON COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT135
1. Primary Liability for Online Activities
a. Overview
To determine the legal status of online use under national law, we
used a catalogue of online acts that may infringe the exclusive rights
of copyright holders. All acts refer to the use of copyright-protected
content from illegal or unauthorized sources, or the provision of access
to works made available without the permission of copyright holders.
They are as follows: downloading; (passive) streaming; stream-
ripping; uploading; hyperlinking; and the sale of kodi boxes or similar
devices with pre-installed add-ons providing links to illegal or
unauthorized sources.136
In most national laws, downloading from illegal or unauthorized
sources is an act of direct copyright infringement of the exclusive right
of reproduction, not privileged by a private use exception or
limitation.137 In the EU, the legal status of the act has been clarified by
the CJEU in ACI Adam, although in Poland there is still some
uncertainty among scholars due to the failure to amend Polish national
law.138 In Brazil, the act of downloading from illegal sources is
probably infringing, but there is some uncertainty due to the lack of
134. See CHRISTINA ANGELOPOULOS, ON ONLINE PLATFORMS AND THE
COMMISSION’S NEW PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL
SINGLE MARKET 14 (2017), https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/
1810/275826.
135. The majority of this Part III.B has been taken directly from QUINTAIS,
GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-
13. Additional text and sources have been provided for further support.
136. This list was supplemented by a catch-all category meant to include other
activities that may infringe copyright specific to a national law. But the national
experts did not report any significant additional types of unauthorized online use of
copyright-protected content not included in our list of categories. QUINTAIS,
GLOBALONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGALBACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.
137. Id. at 143.
138. See Case C-435/12, Adam BV v. Stichting de Thuiskopie, 2014 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0435 (Apr. 10, 2014); QUINTAIS, GLOBALONLINE PIRACY
STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 143.
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case law and the fact that criminal liability is expressly excluded for
these acts.139 In Canada, the act is considered to be infringing;
however, an exception exists for musical sound recordings, as these
are subject to a compensated private copying exception which does
not expressly mention the legal status of the source of reproduction. 140
In Hong Kong, the fair dealing defense may apply on a case-by-case
basis to downloading depending on the purpose thereof (research,
private study, criticism, review, news reporting, or education) and
whether certain requirements are met (acknowledgment and content
removal).141 In Indonesia, non-commercial downloading will in many
instances be covered by a general exception or “fair dealings” clause
to the reproduction right.142 In Japan, this activity is only infringing
regarding digital sound or video recordings and appears to require
knowledge of the unlawful or unauthorized nature of the source.143
By streaming we mean the reception or accessing of a stream by a
user.144 Streaming of this type involves making a temporary and often
139. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 220; Decreto No. 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940, art.
184, Diario Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 31.12.1940 (Braz.).
140. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 235-36. Canadian law provides for two private copying exceptions:
a general uncompensated exception that applies to most subject matter but requires
that the copy does not come from an illegal/unauthorized source; and a compensated
exception (similar to EU law levy systems) for musical sound recordings that is not
tied to the legal status of the source of reproduction. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c
C-42, art. 29.22 § 3 (Can.) [hereinafter Canada Copyright Act].
141. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 251; Copyright Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 528, 1, §§ 38-39,
41 (H.K.).
142. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 262; Copyright Act, No. 28 (2014) art. 46 (Indon.).
143. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 274; Chosakuken Ho [Copyright Law of Japan], Law No.
48 of May 6, 1970, as amended through Law No. 64 of May 23, 1986, art. 30(1)(iii)
[hereinafter Japan Copyright Act].
144. Streaming is a method of transmitting data packets so that the earlier packets
can be reassembled and processed before the entire file is downloaded, allowing for
immediate display or playback. In essence, streaming involves downloading a file
and subsequently causing the downloaded data to become inaccessible. Streaming
can be linear (similar to a broadcast) or interactive/on-demand. See JOÃOQUINTAIS,
COPYRIGHT IN THE AGE OF ONLINE ACCESS: ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION
SYSTEMS IN EUCOPYRIGHT LAW 140-41 (2017) [hereinafter QUINTAIS, COPYRIGHT
IN THEAGE OFONLINEACCESS].
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transient copy of a work; if qualified as a reproduction, it may also be
subject to an exception for these types of copies.145
In the EU, most member states qualify the act of streaming as a
reproduction.146 However, certain national experts made a more
nuanced analysis, influenced by the specific facts of the leading CJEU
case in this respect, Filmspeler.147 The argument is that Filmspeler
only applies if the stream is accessed through a kodi box or similar
device with pre-installed add-ons that link to content made available
online without the permission of rights holders.148 Where streaming is
considered to be a reproduction, all European national laws follow
Filmspeler and exclude the application of the temporary and transient
copying exception to this activity, on the grounds that it does not meet
the “lawful use” requirement.149
Outside the EU there is uncertainty across the board due to the
absence of case law on this topic. In Brazil and Canada it is likely that
streaming is outside the scope of copyright due to its experiential
nature.150 In Canada, even if the act is qualified as a reproduction, it
would likely be privileged by an exception.151 The assessment is
similar in Hong Kong and Japan.152 Only in Indonesia and Thailand is
this activity probably infringing, but this conclusion is uncertain, due
to the lack of specific case law on the matter.153
Stream-ripping is defined here as the use of a software tool that
captures, aggregates, and saves all streaming data.154 The tool allows
users to retain a permanent copy of the protected content streamed,
145. See id.
146. Id. at 146.
147. See Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems, 2017 E.C.R.
I-938 [hereinafter Filmspeler].
148. QUINTAIS, COPYRIGHT IN THE AGE OF ONLINE ACCESS, supra note 144, at
101-02.
149. See id. at 39-40; Filmspeler, 2017 E.C.R. ¶¶ 60-62.
150. See QUINTAIS, COPYRIGHT IN THEAGE OFONLINEACCESS, supra note 144,
at 40.
151. See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 140, § 30.71.
152. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 251-52, 274; Japan Copyright Act, supra note 143, art.
47octies.
153. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 262-63, 283-84.
154. Id. at 97.
836 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [34:4
making it equivalent to a download.155 For the most part, stream-
ripping from illegal or unauthorized sources gets the same legal
treatment as downloading in every national law, as in both cases the
user makes a permanent copy of the work.156 That is to say the majority
of national laws consider it a direct infringement of the reproduction
right.157
This assessment is uncertain, however, owing to the novelty of the
use and the absence of case law. A particularly unclear issue is whether
stream-ripping qualifies as a violation of TPM anti-circumvention
provisions. This would likely require qualification of the stream itself
as an effective copy-control technological measure in legal terms,
which is dubious. In this regard, at least some national laws require a
subjective element—knowledge, awareness or intent—in connection
with TPM circumvention.158
Finally, stream-ripping will often occur from platforms authorized
by copyright holders or shielded by safe harbors, such as Netflix or
YouTube.159 In these cases, the source itself is not illegal but rather an
authorized online service provider. The act of ripping the stream will
sometimes be a breach of the service provider’s terms of service, a
consideration that may affect the legal status of the act (e.g., by
causing the ripped copy to not meet the requirement that it originates
from a lawful or authorized source).160 However, in the absence of
clear guidance from statute or case law in this respect, the legal status
of this activity remains uncertain.161
155. Id.
156. Id. at 8-9.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 102, 115-16, 274; Loi 92-597 du 1 juillet 1992 relative au code de la
propriété intellectuelle [Law 92-597 of July 1, 1992 for the Intellectual Property
Code], JOURNALOFFICIELDELARÉPUBLIQUEFRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIALGAZETTE
OF FRANCE], art. L-131-32 (Fr.); Gesetz uber Urheberrecht und verwandte
Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I
§ 95a (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de [German Copyright Act]; Japan
Copyright Act, supra note 143, art. 30(1)(iii).
159. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 8.
160. See João Quintais, Private Copying and Downloading from Unlawful
Sources, INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 66, 81-82 (2015); Bernd
Justin Jutte, Coexisting Digital Exploitation for Creative Content and the Private
Use Exception, 24 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 2-3 (2015).
161. In Germany, recent judgements have found that websites proving stream-
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Uploading content to a publicly accessible website without the
permission of the copyright holder is either universally qualified as a
direct infringement of the reproduction and communication or making
available to the public rights,162 or solely of the communication to the
public right or a national equivalent. Only two national laws contain
exceptions that may apply to this activity. Under Canadian law, it may
be lawful to upload works (often not in full) to an online platform
under the exception for user-generated content, as well as the limited
fair dealing rights for purposes of research, education, parody, or
satire.163 In Hong Kong, the act may in certain cases benefit from a fair
dealing defense.164
The legal status of hyperlinking is highly controversial in EU law,
following judgments from the CJEU from Svensson to Ziggo.165 After
the landmark GS Media166 decision, posting links to unauthorized
content is subject to a knowledge test connected to a for-profit
condition. In simple terms, the for-profit nature or intent of the linker
triggers a presumption of knowledge of the unauthorized nature of the
content, which if not rebutted leads to a finding of direct infringement
ripping services were infringing copyright and that such activities do not benefit
from the private copying exception. See OLG München, Nov. 22, 2018, 29 U
3619/17 (ZeeZee Media GmbH) (Ger.); OLG Hamburg, Jan. 17, 2019
(Musicmonster.fm); Sigrid Herrenbrück, Streamripper Verletzt Recht Der
Öffentlichen Zugänglichmachung, BUNDESVERBAND MUSIKINDUSTRIE (Feb. 2,
2019), http://www.musikindustrie.de/news-detail/controller/News/action/detail/
news/further-clarity-in-the-area-of-stream-ripping-in-favour-of-rightholders/.
162. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 102, 144, 176.
163. Id. at 237; Canada Copyright Act, supra note 140, art.s 29 & 29.21; see also
Carys J. Craig, Digital Locks and the Fate of Fair Dealing in Canada: In Pursuit of
“Prescriptive Parallelism”, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 4, 503 (2010) (discussing
the the nature and role of fair dealing in Canadian copyright law and the threats
posed to it by technical protection measures and anti-circumvention laws).
164. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 252; Cap. 528, §§ 38-39, 41.
165. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 42; Case 466/12, Svensson et al. v. Retriever Sverige AB,
2014 E.C.R.76; Case 610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV, XS4ALL Internet BV,
2017 E.C.R. 456.
166. See Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al.,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:644 (Sept. 8, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=183124&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=870734.
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of the right of communication to the public.167 As a rule, national laws
in the EU follow this approach, despite its inherent uncertainty. 168
Consequently, posting hyperlinks to unauthorized content is
infringing, as no exception applies.169 The introduction of a knowledge
test in the assessment of primary liability for this exclusive right is a
departure from the strict liability paradigm in copyright law.170
The situation differs outside Europe in four main ways. First, there
is little case law on these types of acts, leading to uncertainty in their
legal qualification. Second, some national laws, like those in Thailand
and Hong Kong, qualify the act of hyperlinking as direct infringement
of the right of communication to the public, without the need to assess
subjective elements.171 Third, other national laws deal with this issue
within the realm of intermediary or secondary liability, as in the case
of Canada, Brazil (joint liability or solidarity, requiring commerciality
of the link), or Japan (tort of facilitating the illegal public transmission
of works).172 Finally, in Indonesia, it appears that posting hyperlinks
does not give rise to liability for copyright infringement.173
A kodi box is a multimedia player with pre-installed add-ons
available online that contain hyperlinks to websites on which
copyright-protected works or other subject-matter are made available
to the public.174 In the EU, Filmspeler raised the possibility that the
sale of kodi boxes, which include by default add-ons that link to works
167. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND





171. Id. at 253, 285.
172. Id. at 221, 238, 274-75; Crookes v. Newton, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269, 269-270
(Can.); Lei 9.610/98, de 19 de febrero de 1998, Lei De Direito Autoral (Braz.)
[hereinafter Brazil Copyright Act]; Chiteki Zaisan Kōto Saibansho [Intellectual
Prop. High Ct.] June 20, 2013, 2011 (wa) no. 15245 CHITEKI KOTO SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI KENSAKU [CHIZAI KŌSAI WEB], http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/app/
files/hanrei_en/893/000893.pdf (Japan); Chiteki Zaisan Kōto Saibansho
[Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] Sept. 15, 2016, 2015 (wa) no. 17928, CHITEKI KOTO
SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI KENSAKU [CHIZAI KŌSAI WEB] http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/
app/files/hanrei_en/230/002230.pdf (Japan).
173. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 285.
174. See id. at 43-44.
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available online without the permission of the copyright holder,
constitutes direct infringement of the right of communication to the
public.175 The CJEU applied theGS Media knowledge test to this case,
leading to a finding of direct infringement.176 Before the judgment in
Filmspeler, this activity was dealt with in the realm of intermediary
liability, for instance in Poland and Germany.177 After the judgment,
however, most experts consider this activity to fall under the realm of
primary liability, subject to a knowledge test described above.178 Since
no exception applies, the act is a direct infringement of the right of
communication to the public.179
Outside the EU, there is nearly no case law on the topic of selling
kodi boxes, leading to uncertain legal qualifications of this act. Based
on broadly worded economic rights under national law, a Brazilian
expert notes that this would probably (more likely than not) qualify as
direct infringement.180 The situation is uncertain in Canadian law.
Despite the grant of interlocutory injunctions in two cases (against the
sale of set-top boxes and a website providing add-ons for kodi boxes),
the legality of this activity is yet to be fully assessed in a pending
case.181 The situation also diverges in Asian countries. In Thailand,
this activity could be covered by the right of communication to the
public, subject to requirements of knowledge (or awareness) and
commerciality.182 Conversely, Japanese and Hong Kong law would
probably deal with this activity under the heading of intermediary,
secondary, or contributory liability and/or infringement by
authorization.183 In Indonesia, the act does not appear to qualify as
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 117, 145; Poland Civil Code, Dz. U. tlum. gb Nr 16, poz. 93, art. 422
(1964); The German Storerhaftung of Wifi, FFII (Mar. 27, 2015),
https://blog.ffii.org/the-german-storerhaftung-of-wifi/ (for Germany, this results in
the application of the doctrine of Störerhaftung).
178. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-44.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 221-22; Brazil Copyright Act, supra note 172, at 29-30, 104-05.
181. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 238-39; Bell Canada et al., [2016] F.C. at ¶ 38.
182. See Thailand Copyright Act B.E. 2537 § 4(5) (A.D. 1994) [hereinafter
Thailand Copyright Act].
183. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 9-10.
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direct infringement.184
b. Areas of Legal Uncertainty
The analysis of primary liability in national laws uncovers three
main areas of legal uncertainty. These refer to the absence of case law
on some activities, the legal treatment of experiential use, and
referential or mediated uses.
First, the absence of case law on many types of acts makes it
difficult to state with certainty whether they violate copyright in some
domestic laws. This is particularly true for acts like stream-ripping,
passive streaming, hyperlinking, and the sale of kodi boxes with
unauthorized add-ons. In the EU, some of this judicial scarcity is
overcome to a certain degree by relying on the interpretative activity
of the CJEU. In other jurisdictions, especially in Brazil and the Asian
countries, it is only possible to rely on probability assessments by
national experts. Therefore, some caution must be exercised before
drawing sweeping judgments on the legal status of these acts.
Second, the legal qualification of stream reception as a copyright-
relevant act is unclear. In the EU, the issue appears to be settled after
Filmspeler.185 However, outside Europe, it is noteworthy that some
domestic laws do not consider this activity to merit copyright
protection. This is based on the fact that that passive streaming is
experiential in nature, similar to the offline equivalent of reading a
book or viewing a TV series. As such, legally, streaming would not
constitute a use of copyright.
Third, there is uncertainty in what we term referential or mediated
use. This refers to types of acts like hyperlinking and the sale of kodi
boxes with pre-installed add-ons, that are in some countries mostly
likely governed by the right of communication to the public under a
strict liability regime (Thailand and Hong Kong); in EU domestic laws
governed by the same right but subject to a knowledge test stemming
from CJEU case law; in another set of laws governed by intermediary
liability regimes (Canada, Brazil, and Japan); and in one country
184. Id. at 250-92; see Thailand Copyright Act, supra note 182, § 31; Saikō
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Feb. 13. 2001, Hei 955 (Ju) no. 1, 55 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHOMINJI
HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 87, 90 (JAPAN); Cap. 528, §§ 22(2), 273B(1); CBS Songs
Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc., [1988] RPC 567, 578.
185. Id.
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apparently not giving rise to liability for copyright infringement
(Indonesia). Our main observation in this respect is that for these acts
there is a blurring of the lines between primary and secondary liability,
with a significant degree of uncertainty as to the application of
subjective elements in the assessment of the exclusive right of
communication to the public.
A final note should be made regarding the relevance of elements
like knowledge, commerciality and content type. As a rule, there are
no noteworthy differences for the assessment of primary liability
depending on the type of content at issue, namely music, films and TV
series, books, or video games.186 Regarding knowledge and
commerciality, the main points to emphasize are those noted above. In
sum, other than the consideration of knowledge in the context of the
legal qualification of downloading in Japanese law, the majority of
acts described—from downloading to uploading—are strict liability
torts. The situation differs when assessing the right of communication
to the public in EU countries, and its application to hyperlinking and
the sale of kodi boxes. In those cases, the subjective element of
knowledge plays a central role in the legal qualification of the act. The
CJEU has created a rebuttable presumption that relies on the for-profit
nature, character and/or intent of the linker, the precise contours of
which are still in flux. Thus, in this context, the commercial nature or
intent of the act plays an important role in the legal assessment of
primary liability.
2. Intermediary or Secondary Liability
a. Overview: Notion of Intermediary and Safe Harbors
In the EU, all national laws have implemented the ECD’s safe
harbors and no monitoring obligation, as well as related provisions. 187
Most laws fail to provide copyright-specific notions of
“intermediary”, advancing instead broader notions of intermediary or
186. The legal qualification of video games in national law as an independent
work and/or as software is not clear in law national laws examined here. But this
potential difference does not appear to affect themain conclusions regarding liability
for the acts described above. See id. at 10, 17, 20, 37, 46, 70, 78.
187. See id. at 118-70. The relevant exception is Poland, which has not
implemented Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive on injunctions against
intermediaries.
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service provider in civil law or in national e-commerce legislation.
Due to the implementation of the ECD, all national laws contain a
definition of “information society service provider” or the like.188
The laws analyzed do not appear to contain positive rules
determining the liability of Internet intermediaries, but rather a partial
regulation of the same through safe harbors that provide liability
exemptions or immunities (for damages) to at least three types of
intermediary services—mere conduit, caching, and hosting—in terms
identical to the directive, as interpreted by the CJEU.
Despite that, there are some noteworthy national idiosyncrasies. For
example, Spanish law contains a separate safe harbor for search
engines and hyperlinks (which other laws place under the hosting
exemption), while Dutch law provides a safe harbor from criminal
copyright liability identical to those existing for civil liability.189 Also,
UK law clarifies the applicability of safe harbors not only for damages,
but also for any other pecuniary remedy or any criminal sanctions.190
The most controversial safe harbor is that of hosting and its
application to large scale user-upload websites, such as YouTube and
Daily Motion, as exemplified by judgments in France, Germany, and
Spain.191 As a rule, the hosting safe harbor is tied to requirements of
actual knowledge or awareness of the illegality of the content hosted,
coupled with an obligation remove or disable the content hosted upon
acquiring knowledge. In most cases, actual knowledge results from
notice of the infringement sent by the copyright holder or his
representative, containing a number of legally defined elements, such
as information about the applicant, description of facts and URL, and
the legal basis, among other things. Reception of a valid notice leads
to an obligation of prompt takedown by the intermediary.
188. Id.; see also Council Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 119, art. 2(a)
(providing a definition of such providers).
189. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 127-37, 151-70; Ley 34/2002, de 11 de julio, sobre
Servicios de la de Sociedad de la Información y Comercio Electrónico art. 17
(B.O.E. 2002, 187) (Spain); Artikel 36e lid. 2 SR (OUD).
190. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 199-215; The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations,
2002, S.I. 2001/2555, §§ 17-19 (U.K.).
191. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 100-26, 151-70.
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The Netherlands set up a more elaborate private notice-and-
takedown (NTD) system. Based on the implementation of the directive
in its Civil Code, several Dutch intermediaries adopted a Code of
Conduct setting out voluntary NTD procedures for copyright
infringing content.192 Notably, only two other Codes of Conduct were
mentioned by national experts in their responses, both of them in the
UK. The first is the Voluntary Copyright Alert Programme, which
forms part of the industry-led scheme Creative Content UK; this is
discussed below in the context of administrative enforcement
measures. The second is the Voluntary Code of Practice on Search and
Copyright agreed on in early 2017 by leading search engines,
entertainment trade bodies, and music industry body BPI, in a deal
brokered by the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO). Under the
Code, search engines commit to the removal of links to websites that
have been repeatedly served with copyright infringement notices from
the first page of their search results, with the aim of preventing UK
internet users from downloading and streaming protected content
illegally. These commitments include specific targets for reducing the
visibility of infringing content in search results.193
It is important to note that safe harbors set out specific liability
exemptions but do not establish the conditions under which
intermediaries are liable for copyright infringement by third parties
using their services. Most domestic laws determine such liability
through the application of general tort law and doctrines of
contributory infringement. Due to the specificities of online copyright
infringement, this has led to the development of specific torts for
Internet intermediaries. In Germany, courts usually rely on and
develop the civil law tort of “interferer liability” (Störerhaftung). An
interferer is a person who has willfully made a causal contribution to
the direct copyright infringement by a third party. That person can be
held liable for injunctive relief (not damages) if they have violated a
192. Id. at 127-37; ECP, PLATFORM VOOR DE INFORMATIE, SAMENLEVING,
GEDRAGSCODE NOTICE-AND-TAKE-DOWN (2018), https://ecp.nl/publicaties/ntd-
gedragscode-nl/.
193. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 199-215; Mark Jackson, UPDATE2 UK ISPs to Send First Internet
Piracy Warning Letters this Month, ISP REV. (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.ispreview.co.uk/index.php/2017/01/big-uk-isps-send-first-internet-
piracy-warning-letters-month.html.
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reasonable duty of care to prevent the direct infringement at stake.
These rules interact with safe harbors insofar as compliance with the
latter is considered when assessing if the intermediary has violated a
reasonable duty of care.194 Spanish law, by contrast, has implemented
a tort of indirect liability that strongly resembles a transplant from
judge-made doctrines in United States law, as it includes identical
formulations on contributory infringement, inducement, and vicarious
liability.195
The legal landscape of intermediary liability outside the EU is
irregular. In Brazil, the Copyright Act does not define intermediaries
or include safe harbors. A different piece of legislation, the Internet
Civil Act (Marco Civil) does include such provisions, but it expressly
excludes its application to copyright. This has led courts to deal with
intermediary liability by combining provisions from the Copyright
Act, the Civil Code, and the Consumer Rights Code. In doing so, the
Superior Court of Justice has developed a secondary liability—a
“subsidiary responsibility”—regime for hosting providers relying on
tort law. This is in essence a NTD regime where knowledge is obtained
by a sufficiently complete private notice, which gives rise to an
obligation to promptly remove content on a temporary basis. The
provider must then assess the legality of the content and may re-upload
the content if it considers it lawful. Different factors must be taken into
account when assessing the liability of providers in this context.196
Canadian law is different insofar as it contains a rich mix of
intermediary liability provisions. First, it provides a general safe
harbor for intermediaries, according to which the mere supply of a
194. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 112-26.
195. Id. at 151-70; see also Por el Que se Aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley
de Propiedad Intelectual, Regularizando, Aclarando y Armonizando las
Disposiciones Legales Vigentes sobre la Materia art. 138 (B.O.E. 1996, 97) (Spain)
[hereinafter Spain Intellectual Property Law].
196. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 216-33; see also Lei No. 12.965, de 24 de abril de 2014, DIÁRIO
OFFICIAL DE UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 24.4.2014, arts. 19, 31 (Braz); S.T.J.-nº
1.512.647/15, Relator: Ministro Luis Felipe Salomao (2013) (Braz.); S.T.J.-nº
1.396.417/13, Relator: Ministra Nancy Andrighi (2013) (Braz.); S.T.J.- nº
1.328.706/13, Relator: Ministro Luis Felipe Salomao, 09.04.2018 (Braz.); S.T.J.-
(AREsp) nº 259.482/13, Relator: Ministro Sidnei Beneti (2012) (Braz.); S.T.J.--
(AREsp) nº 259.482/13, Relator: Ministro Sidnei Beneti (2012) (Braz.).
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(broadly construed) “means of telecommunications” does not give rise
to liability for the provider. This is combined with specific safe
harbors for the traditional types of intermediary services, namely
network services (mere conduit or access), incidental acts (caching),
and hosting, as well as for “information location tools.” The combined
application of these provisions, as interpreted by the courts, exempts
from civil liability a broad range of intermediaries, including search
engines.197
The application of safe harbors is subject to specific conditions for
each category of services, like “neutrality” and knowledge, but also to
a general condition, namely that the act at stake does not infringe upon
a general “enabler liability” provision. This provision has the function
of positively defining the instances in which an intermediary is liable,
such as when its service is used primarily for the purpose of enabling
copyright infringement and an actual infringement occurs as a result
of the use of the service. Note, however, that there is little to no case
law on this provision.198
Canadian law also includes two further idiosyncrasies. First, it has
instituted a “notice-and-notice” system, under which an ISP does not
have to takedown content or disclose personal data, but merely relay
the notice of infringement to its subscriber linked to the IP address.
The non-compliant ISP is only subject to capped statutory damages. 199
Finally, the Copyright Act provides for a user-generated content
exception. Where the exception applies to uploading by end-users, the
hosting platform in question will not be liable for hosting that
content.200
Still different regimes exist in Asia. In Hong Kong, for example,
there are no safe harbors for intermediaries. Their liability can be
established under two headings—infringement by authorization and
197. See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 140 at § 1.4(1)(b).
198. See id. §§ 27(2.3), 31.1.(6).
199. Id. § 41.26(3) (containing the recent update to the Canadian copyright notice-
and-notice rules under which ISPs are “no longer required to forward notices that
contain an offer to settle, a payment demand or a link to a payment demand”);
Michael Geist, No More Settlement Demands: New Rules for Canadian Copyright
Notice-and-Notice System Receive Royal Assent, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Dec. 17,
2019), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/12/no-more-settlement-demands-new-
rules-for-copyright-notice-and-notice-system-receives-royal-assent/.
200. See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 140, § 29.21.
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contributory infringement as a common law tort. Both imply case
sensitive inquiries as to issues like content removal and obligations of
intermediaries.201 Indonesian law also lacks specific safe harbors.
Intermediaries are subject to a duty of care principle stemming from
the Civil Code as well as to specific obligations specified in different
Circular Letters from competent Ministries. These include providing
reporting means for infringing content they host and removal or
blocking of content upon acquiring knowledge thereof.202 Japanese
law is unclear on the criteria for definition of intermediary liability but
does contain safe harbors for damages from infringement caused by
information distribution, which are conditional upon the technical
possibility of preventing such distribution and knowledge or
awareness of the infringing act or the possibility of its occurrence. To
avoid liability, the ISP must act upon that knowledge and remove the
content.203 Finally, the law of Thailand provides for a safe harbor
(regarding damages) for intermediaries that are neutral towards the
infringing content and comply with a judicial order against the
same.204
b. Areas of Legal Uncertainty
In the EU, there is uncertainty in the majority of the member states
as a result of CJEU case law on the right of communication to the
public and on the safe harbors in the ECD. On the one hand, the broad
interpretation of the right and the introduction of subjective elements
in its assessment extended its application to the activities of certain
online platforms, in particular those hosting content. On the other
hand, the CJEU has clarified that only predominantly “neutral”—but
not necessarily passive—intermediaries may benefit from safe
harbors. Further uncertainty arises from the difficulty in assessing the
201. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at at 250-59; see also Cap. 528, § 22(2).
202. Id. at 260-72; see also Minister of Communication and Informatics of the
Republic of Indonesia, No. 3 2016, Circular Letters (2016); Minister of
Communication and Informatics of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 5 2016, Circular
Letters (2016).
203. Id.; see also Limitation of Liability for Damages of Specified
Telecommunications Service Provider, Act No. 137 of 2001, art. 3(2) (Japan).
204. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 287; see also Thailand Copyright Act, supra note 182, sec.
32(3).
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“actual knowledge” requirement for hosting platforms, as well in
delineating what constitute admissible “specific” monitoring
obligations for intermediaries.205 Thus, in this context, it remains
uncertain where to draw the line between primary liability and the safe
harbor provision for hosting platforms in the ECD. This uncertainty is
at the heart of the controversial provision on the (direct) liability of
online content-sharing services for uploads by their users in the recent
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market.206
Some of these challenges are echoed in national laws. For instance,
German law struggles in differentiating when hybrid service providers
(e.g. YouTube) use their own information/content—in which case
they are primarily liable—from when they use external or third-party
information content, in which case they may benefit from safe
harbors.207 This has led to a pending preliminary reference by the
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) to the CJEU on this topic
that promises to shape EU law in this context.208 In Spain, the
articulation of the relatively new provisions on indirect liability with
safe harbors is yet to be defined.209 Finally, in Sweden there is the
expectation that some types of acts currently dealt with as
intermediary liability are recast as instances of primary liability, with
consequences for the types of remedies available against online
platforms.210
Outside Europe, there are also certain areas of legal uncertainty, but
205. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.2.a.
206. Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market (OJ L
130/92 ) 17.5.2019, art. 17.
207. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 119-20; see also Act on Telemedia, Feb. 26, 2007 (as
amended by the Law of May 31, 2010), at sec. 7.1 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice] [UrhG], Nov. 12, 2009, I ZR 166/07 (Ger.);
Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgericht in München [OLG] [Higher Regional Court],
Jan. 28, 2016, 29 U 2798/15 (Ger.).
208. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Nov. 6, 2018,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 13, 2018
(Ger.); BGH 140/15, at 1.
209. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 157-58; Spain Intellectual Property Law, supra note 195,
art. 138.
210. See QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND
REPORT, supra note 1, at 182-83.
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not to the same extent as in the EU. In Brazil, for example, there is
uncertainty on how to establish liability of ISPs in the context of the
evolving judge-made doctrine of “subsidiary responsibility” described
above. In Canada, the main uncertainty arises from the absence of case
law on the aforementioned provision on “enabler liability”, which
operates also as a condition for the application of safe harbors.211
In Hong Kong, the extent of involvement required to establish the
liability of intermediaries remains uncertain, as the potentially
applicable doctrines are heavily case sensitive and have not been
sufficiently interpreted by the courts. In Indonesia, any uncertainty
would probably relate to the case-by-case application of the duty of
care principle to online intermediaries. In Japan, there are doubts
surrounding the legal qualification of video sharing platforms as direct
infringers of ISPs benefiting from safe harbors. Finally, in Thailand,
the uncertainty relates to whether existing safe harbors can shield ISPs
from liability arising out of criminal copyright infringement.212
C. ENFORCEMENTMEASURES213
This Part deals with public and private enforcement measures,
procedures, remedies, and sanctions against online copyright
infringement available in national law. These measures can be civil
(e.g. injunctions), administrative (like warnings), or criminal (such as
prison sentences). Enforcement measures may be aimed at the direct
infringer—the user of protected content—or at intermediaries.214
211. Id.
212. Id. at 13; see Cap. 528, § 22(2) (discussing infringement by authorization);
Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] Sept. 8, 2010, Hei 21
(ne) no. 10078, 2115 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 102 (Japan). In Thailand, service
providers are subject to court orders based on sec. 20 of the Computer-Related Crime
Act for suppression of dissemination or removal of computer data which infringes
copyright and constitutes a criminal act. SeeComputer-Related CrimeAct B.E. 2550
(2007) (as amended by the Computer-Related Crime Act (No. 2) B.E. 2560 (2017))
(stating that service providers are subject to court orders based on section 20 of the
Computer-Related Crime Act for suppression of dissemination or removal of
computer data which infringes copyright and constitutes a criminal act, but it is not
clear whether the safe harbours apply only to damages claims based on civil law,
since that Act does not provide for safe harbours).
213. The majority of this Part III.C has been taken directly from QUINTAIS,
GLOBALONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 14-
22. Additional text and sources have been provided for further support.
214. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
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1. Enforcement Measures Against Users
a. Civil Enforcement
At the EU level, civil measures are harmonized in the Enforcement
Directive, and include different types of injunctive relief and damages
calculated according to the directive. As a rule, punitive or exemplary
damages are not available. All member states have implemented the
directive with varying degrees of detail, and largely follow its regime.
Some details are worth pointing out.
German law includes provisions that incentivize parties to settle
claims out of court; namely, detailed requirements for notifications to
alleged direct and indirect infringers to “cease and desist” prior to
instituting judicial proceedings. Dutch law allows for ex parte
injunctions in the context of preliminary relief proceedings, subject to
a showing of a risk of irreparable damage. Spanish law contains
injunctions in the form of “restraining orders” specifically designed
for the online environment, including measures to suspend the Internet
access of infringers, block access to or remove infringing content from
websites, and to require personal data of the infringer from ISPs in
“special cases.”215
UK law does not entitle the copyright holder to damages if, at the
time of infringement, the defendant did not know or had no reason to
believe that copyright subsisted in the work to which the action relates.
However, additional damages may be available taking into account the
flagrancy of the infringement or the profits made by the infringer. An
account for profits is available as an alternative for damages.
Regarding injunctions, UK law has developed a “search order”
(formerly known as the “Anton Pillar order”) to allow the preservation
of evidence prior to trial in copyright infringement cases, which can
be combined with a “freezing” or “asset preservation” order for the
retention of property pending litigation.216
Outside the EU, Brazilian law provides for injunctions and damages
supra note 1, at 14 (noting that the analysis did not reveal there to be significant
differences in national laws between public and private enforcement practices
depending on the type of protected content: music, audio-visual, books, and video
games).
215. Id. at 61.
216. Id. at 62, 81.
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for copyright infringement. However, since the law is outdated
regarding online use, the application of such measures must in some
instances be done through analogy. Still, there is sufficient flexibility
in the law to encompass injunctions and coercive fines against
individuals or platforms that disseminate works online. Furthermore,
the provisions on damages—even where they refer to offline copies—
can arguably accommodate the specificities of online infringement.
Finally, a recent trend in the case law points towards a consideration
of ISPs as jointly liable for copyright infringement where they fail to
takedown content subsequent to an adequate (private) notice.217
Canadian law imposes liability on users for copyright infringement
and circumvention of TPMs. In terms of infringement, copyright
holders are entitled to injunctions, damages and accounts. Moreover,
statutory damages for commercial and non-commercial infringements
are available as an alternative to actual damages.218 The laws of Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand all provide for injunctions and
damages against direct infringers.219
b. Administrative Enforcement
Among the countries studied, administrative enforcement measures
against direct online copyright infringement by users only exist in
France, the UK, Indonesia, and Thailand. Additionally, Spanish law
contains a special administrative procedure directed at ISPs that can
be applied both to “users” and “intermediaries”, depending on how
these concepts are defined.
In regards to online infringement, French law includes a graduated
response system that is of mixed nature, administrative and criminal.
The system, which has gone through different iterations, is managed
by an administrative authority (the HADOPI), and works as follows.
Individual Internet users have an obligation to ensure that their
connections are not used to infringe copyright. After a 2013
amendment, the penalty for violating this obligation is no longer
Internet disconnection but instead, fines up to € 1.5 thousand. This
217. Id. at 62-63, 222.
218. Id. at 63 (the regime is similar for TPM circumvention, with the exception
that no statutory damages are available against individuals who circumvent TPMs
for their own private purposes).
219. Id. at 63-64.
2019] THEDECLINE OFONLINE PIRACY 851
sanction can only be levied if certain conditions are met; notably, not
having a secure Internet connection may not allow the subscriber to
avoid sanctions.220
In the UK, the Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA 2010) included a
graduated response system for the online enforcement of copyright,
with similarities to the first iteration of its French counterpart (i.e.,
including Internet disconnection as a sanction). However, this
controversial system was never adopted. Instead, in 2014, the UK
government promoted the adoption of an industry-led scheme called
Creative Content UK, adopted by the UK’s creative industries and
ISPs. One major element of this scheme was the aforementioned
Voluntary Copyright Alert Programme. This consists of email alerts
sent by ISPs to residential broadband subscribers whose accounts are
used to infringe copyright via p2p file-sharing. The Programme
involves agents of copyright owners sending evidence of copyright
infringement to ISPs, which then send letters or alerts to infringing
customers with the intent to discourage infringement. A maximum of
four letters with language escalating in severity can be sent to a single
IP address. No sanctions are admitted under the Programme, but
copyright holders are free to pursue legal action against the
individuals.221 The first letters were sent to subscribers in early
2017.222 More recently, the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) has
stated that it intends to set up a new a new “administrative site
blocking” process that requires “broadband ISPs to block customers
from accessing websites that facilitate internet piracy.”223
Indonesian law contains a Joint Regulation of two Ministries from
2015, based on a provision in the Copyright Act.224 This regulation
provides a procedure for complaints related to online copyright
infringement reported to either of the two Ministries, directly or
220. Id. at 64-65.
221. Id. at 65.
222. Id.
223. This system would function as an alternative to blocking injunctions
obtained under sec. 97A of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, which
require a judicial order. Mark Jackson, Government to Remove Courts from UK ISP
Piracy Website Blocks, ISP REV. (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.ispreview.co.uk/
index.php/2018/10/government-to-remove-courts-from-uk-isp-piracy-website-
blocks.html.
224. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 66.
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through an electronic system in the website of the competent authority.
Complaints can be submitted by copyright holders, licensees or
CMOs, and are verified by a team at one of the Ministries, who issues
recommendations on applicable measures. Decisions can be made to
partly or entirely block access to infringing content, and there is a
database of blocked sites/users. In addition, a Circular Letter from a
Ministry imposes on user-generated content platform providers an
obligation to provide a reporting instrument for complaints regarding
inter alia copyright infringing content they host. If sufficient evidence
is provided with the notice/complaint, platform providers must take
necessary action to remove the content or block access thereto.225
The law of Thailand, in particular the Computer-Related Crimes
Act, provides for an administrative enforcement measure for copyright
infringement that constitutes a crime. This measure allows officials
with approval from the Minister to file petitions for writs to stop
dissemination of information, or to order the deletion of data from
systems where inter alia the information or data in question qualifies
as criminal copyright infringement. If the copyright infringement
“bears characteristics which are contrary to peace and order or good
morals”, a separate procedure applies, involving the intervention of a
“Computer Data Screening Committee” prior to the Minister’s
approval. In both cases, this power is broad in scope, allowing
competent/authorized officers to compel the removal or suppression
in question, or to carry it out by themselves. Users that do not comply
with the court order are subject to multiple fines.226
Finally, Spain introduced a law in 2011, which instituted a special
administrative injunction procedure by the Intellectual Property
Commission (sec. 2) against infringements done for commercial
purposes by ISP. The procedure, reinforced and enlarged in 2004, may
be understood as applying both to users and intermediaries. This is
because it covers not only categories of intermediaries that
traditionally benefit from safe harbors (e.g., pure hosting) but also
websites that may be qualified as directly infringing copyright,
depending on the specific case. The latter include user-generated
content websites and those providing links to infringing contents,
which may for example directly infringe upon the right of
225. Id. at 66.
226. Id. at 66-67.
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communication to the public. Where the procedure applies the latter
type of website, it may be considered as targeting such websites as
“users.” Measures available under this procedure include the
suspension of the Internet service provided to the infringer, blocking
and removing infringing contents, and publication of notices regarding
the infringement.227
c. Criminal Enforcement
There is no harmonization of criminal measures against copyright
infringement in the EU. Most member states criminalize intentional
acts of direct copyright infringement and subject them to varying
sanctions, ranging from fines to prison terms, and including seizure of
infringing material and publication of the sentence. Offenses are
usually aggravated if they occur on a commercial scale or with a for-
profit aim. Among the crimes listed is the manufacture and distribution
of TPM circumventing devices.228
Unlike in countries like Germany where these provisions are
irrelevant in practice, they play a more prominent role in countries
such as France and Spain. In France, in addition to the typical criminal
provisions, for offenses committed using an online service courts can
order the additional penalty of suspension of Internet access for a
maximum of one year, during which period the person is prohibited
from entering into another contract for the same service with any
operator.229 The termination is notified by the court to the HADOPI,
who in turn notifies the ISP to carry it out under the penalty of a fine. 230
Spanish law, for its part, was amended in 2015 with the aim of
extending the scope of criminal copyright sanctions to users of p2p
services, a change that appears to be nudging the courts to increasingly
condemn these types of users, as well as the respective platform
operators.231 In Sweden, criminal provisions have been used to target
a user of a file-sharing website for contributory criminal liability.232
The general framework of criminal measures in the American and
227. Id. at 65.
228. Id. at 67-69.
229. Id. at 16 (noting that in France when a person commits an online offense, the
court can suspend internet access for a maximum of one year).
230. Id. at 67.
231. Id. at 68.
232. Id. at 69.
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Asian countries is similar to that of EU member states. One relevant
difference is found in Brazilian law, which does not criminalize acts
covered by an exception or limitation or the making of single copies
of copyright-protected content for private and non-commercial aims,
for example in the context of downloading or stream-ripping.233
2. Enforcement Measures Against Intermediaries
The aim of enforcement measures against intermediaries is for them
to end or prevent infringement by third party users of their services.
Examples of such measures include: suspension of the infringer from
the Internet; measures to identify the infringer; the monitoring or
filtering of content; the blocking or removing of infringing content,
including in the context of NTD procedures; warning systems;
obligations imposed on service providers to notify public authorities
of alleged infringing activities or information provided by recipients
of their service; and graduated response systems.234
a. Civil Measures
Under EU law, intermediaries that qualify for the safe harbors in the
ECD are not liable for damages but only for injunctions—pursuant to
Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive—and duties of care, as permitted
by the ECD and further established in national law. In all cases,
measures must not conflict with the general prohibition against
monitoring, under the national equivalent to Article 15 ECD, and must
strike a fair balance between competing fundamental rights in line
with CJEU case law. All member states contain different flavors of
measures. It is worth providing some examples of those that are most
unique to online enforcement.
In France, if a computer program is mainly used for unlawfully
making available protected content (e.g., p2p software), a judicial
order may be issued to take all necessary measures to protect the right
233. Decreto No. 2.848, art. 184(4).
234. In this article we do not discuss national rules on the disclosure of personal
data in the context of enforcement or rules on the entitlement to apply for
enforcement measures. For details on these, see QUINTAIS, GLOBALONLINEPIRACY
STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 17; CHRISTINA J.
ANGELOPOULOUS, EUROPEAN INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT: A TORT-
BASED ANALYSIS 308-10 (2016) (discussing the procedures of Notice-and-Take-
Down as a way of blocking and removing infringing content).
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in question, which may include certain filtering mechanisms. In
addition, a court may also order an ISP whose services are used for
copyright infringement to implement measures to prevent or to block
the infringement acts, such as removal of suggestions from a search
engine service.235
In Germany, the tort of “interferer liability” allows for injunctions
against intermediaries that violate reasonable duties of care to prevent
such direct infringements. These include removing infringing content
upon notice from copyright holders, and taking reasonable measures
such as filtering to prevent further comparable infringements in the
future. Information injunctions are also available against
intermediaries.236
In the UK, Section 97A CDPA implemented Article 8(3) of the
InfoSoc Directive, and allows injunctions against ISPs, subject to
certain conditions. Most of the case law on this provision concerns
blocking injunctions. In addition, intermediaries are also subject to
Norwich Pharmacal orders, i.e. a form of disclosure order that amounts
to an information injunction.237
Outside Europe, Brazilian law does not specify enforcement
measures against intermediaries. As noted, this led to the Superior
Court of Justice developing a secondary liability or “subsidiary
responsibility” regime for hosting providers on the basis of tort law.
Failure by ISPs to meet the conditions of this regime subjects them to
contributory liability and remedies like injunctions and damages.238
Canadian law contains generous safe harbors for intermediaries and
a notice-and-notice regime aimed at discouraging online copyright
infringement. Under this regime, a claimant’s only remedy against an
ISP who fails to perform its obligations are capped statutory
damages.239 The law further includes as an exception to safe harbors
the aforementioned provision on “enabler liability.” The provision has
yet to be interpreted by the courts but could apply to platforms like
235. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 71.
236. Id. at 71–72.
237. Id. at 73.
238. Id. at 73–74.
239. Id.; see Canada Copyright Act, supra note 140, §§ 29.22, 79 et seq.
(establishing the Canadian laws for copyright infringement under the Notice-and-
Take-Down-regime).
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The Pirate Bay or Popcorn Time.240 Canadian law also includes a
somewhat similar rule prohibiting the provision of services or
manufacturing technology primarily for the purposes of facilitating the
circumvention of TPMs. Finally, copyright holders have the
possibility to obtain information injunctions against ISPs under the
form of Norwich Orders.241
Under the law of Hong Kong, intermediaries may be liable for
infringement by authorization or contributory infringement. If found
liable, they are subject to similar civil remedies as direct infringers,
namely injunctions and takedown orders, damages, and account of
profits. Injunctions may include: takedown orders against forums;
website blocking orders against ISPs; and de-indexing orders against
indexing and bookmarking sites, including search engines.242 The law
of Indonesia does not contain specific civil enforcement measures
against online intermediaries. However, since civil liability of
intermediaries is based on a duty of care principle, a finding of liability
will lead to the application of the same civil remedies as for direct
infringers.243 Under Japanese law, it is unclear whether intermediaries
are subject to injunctions similar to those available under Article 8(3)
of the InfoSoc Directive, despite a specific instance (the TV Break
case) where a video-sharing platform was subject to an injunction for
direct infringement. An intermediary will be subject to the remedy of
damages available in the Civil Code if considered a joint tortfeasor. In
addition, the ISP Liability Limitation Act allows for a specific
information injunction against ISPs.244 Finally, the law of Thailand
allows for intermediaries to be subject to remedies of damages and
injunctions if they are negligent and cause damages to right holders. 245
240. See supra Parts III.B.2.a-b.
241. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 74; see also Canada Copyright Act, supra note 140, § 41(1)(b)-(c)
(establishing the prohibition on circumventing technological protection).
242. Id. at 74.
243. Id. at 74–75.
244. Id. at 75; see [Law Concerning the Limits of Liability for Damages of
Specified Telecommunications Service Providers and the Right to Request
Disclosure of Identification Information of the Sender], Law No. 137 of 2001, art.
3(2)(ii) (Japan), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/Resources/
laws/Compensation-Law.pdf.
245. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 75.
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b. Administrative Measures
Most national laws do not contain administrative measures
specifically targeting online intermediaries. To the extent
intermediaries qualify as users due to the nature of their activities, they
are subject to the administrative measures available against direct
infringers. The exceptions to this are Spain, Indonesia, and
Thailand.246
In Spain, as noted, since 2011 there has been a specific injunction
procedure with the Intellectual Property Commission (sec. 2) against
ISPs whose services may be used inter alia by third parties to infringe
copyright for commercial purposes.247 If the ISP fails to withdraw
content or cease the infringement, this broad injunction allows the
Commission to order a range of measures, subject to payment of fines.
These measures include the suspension of the service provided to the
infringer, the blocking and removing of infringing contents or domain
names, suspension of advertisement on the infringing site, and the
publication of notices regarding infringement. Rulings of this body
require prior judicial approval by an administrative court. Based on
the data available on these measures, their effectiveness is uncertain. 248
In Indonesia, a Joint Regulation affords ISPs some discretion on
how to deal with infringing content or activities carried out by third
parties using their services. The intermediary will first send the user a
warning letter to cease the infringement and/or terminate its contract
with the user, leading to the blocking or deletion of the allegedly
infringing content. Furthermore, it is possible that the user’s Internet
access is suspended pending the finalization of the process for
producing evidence of the infringement by the Ministry of
Communication and Information.249
Finally, in Thailand, two administrative measures are available
against intermediaries. First, the Copyright Act allows for a court
order against an ISP for the removal of infringing content from its
246. In addition, in the UK, the described Voluntary Copyright Alert Programme
system is also relevant for intermediaries insofar as their services are used to send
notices to end-users. See supra Part III.C.1.b.
247. See supra Part III.C.1.b. (describing the requirements of this procedure).
248. Id. at 75–76.
249. Id. at 76.
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system.250 Second, the Computer-Related Crime Act provides for an
administrative enforcement measure in case of copyright infringement
that constitutes a crime, aimed at the suppression of dissemination or
removal of computer data which infringes copyright and constitutes a
criminal offence.251 The ISP that disregards the first type of Court
order faces no penalty but is subject to a subsequent civil lawsuit
where this conduct may be relevant.252 Failure to comply with the
second order subjects the provider to steep fines.253
c. Criminal Measures
Most national laws do not contain criminal measures specifically
targeting online intermediaries. To the extent intermediaries commit,
or are involved in (by assisting or inducing others), any of the crimes
of copyright infringement defined in national law, they are subject to
the criminal measures applicable to users. Apart from that, it is worth
to briefly mention the laws of Spain and Japan.
In 2015, Spanish law introduced a new crime tailored for websites
that offer links to infringing content (e.g., on p2p and other platforms)
and regardless of whether their activities are themselves infringing. 254
The crime does not apply to “neutral” search engines or to ISPs that
only “occasionally link to third party infringing contents.”255
Regarding the situation in Japan, other than the measures applicable
to accessories to a crime in the Japanese Penal Code, it is worth
mentioning a case concerning the “Winny” file sharing software.256 In
this case, after the Kyoto District court convicted a person who
released the software of a crime of inducing third party copyright
infringement, both the Osaka High Court and later the Supreme Court
denied the crime on the ground that the accused lacked intent to be an
accessory to the crime of copyright infringement.257
250. Id. at 286, 289-90.
251. Id. at 288.
252. Id. at 289 (discussing when civil lawsuits are possible).
253. Id. at 76-77 (describing the administrative enforcement measures against
intermediaries).
254. Id. at 164-65.
255. Id. at 77, 151-52.
256. Id. at 278.
257. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 278; see also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 19, 2011, 2009 (A)
1900 no. 9, 65 Saikō Saibansho Keiji Hanreishū [Keishū] 1,
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3. Most Used and Effective Enforcement Measures
Finally, we asked the national experts in our study about the most
widely used or effective public and private enforcement measures in
their country.
In France, reference was made to HADOPI’s graduated response
system—although doubts were expressed as to its effectiveness—as
well as the legal provision that prohibits acts in relation to software
that enables infringement.258 In Germany, the most widely used and
most effective enforcement measure is the cease-and-desist letter.259
In the Netherlands, the issuing of court orders to require Internet
access providers to block access to infringing websites is particular
popular, although there is debate (even at judicial level) on how to
assess its efficiency.260 It is also common for Dutch intermediaries to
employ voluntary NTD procedures, according to the aforementioned
code of conduct in place for ISPs in the Netherlands.261 Finally, the
anti-piracy organization Stichting BREIN frequently initiates civil
enforcement actions against large-scale infringers.262 In Poland, the
most common measures are civil law injunctions and orders of
damages based on the amount of double license fees, while sanctions
against intermediaries are rare.263
In Spain, there has been frequent use of injunctions by the
Intellectual Property Commission (sec. 2) to remove and block access
to infringing content, disconnect the Internet service of infringers and
cancel or block “.es” domain names or infringing websites.264Criminal
sanctions introduced in 2015 are only recently starting to be issued and
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1131 (Japan).
258. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 106–07; see also CODEDE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP.
INTELL.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] arts. L335-2 (Fr.); Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Paris, crim., Feb. 27, 2018, Bull. crim.,
No. 16-86881 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
crim., Sept. 25, 2012, Bull. crim., No. 11-84224 (Fr.).
259. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 86, 121-22.
260. Id. at 136.
261. Id. at 134, 136.
262. Id. at 86-87.
263. Id. at 87.
264. Id. at 156, 162.
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drawing media attention.265 Moreover, a 2015 administrative
procedure, where all Spanish ISPs were ordered by the
aforementioned Commission to suspend service and block access
within 72 hours to any websites identified as belonging to The Pirate
Bay group.266 Finally, it was noted that CMOs typically notify ISPs
about infringing content available on their websites and threaten with
judicial action unless that content is blocked or removed/delisted, a
practice that appears to be effective.267
In Sweden, the information injunction is a particularly effective
measure for copyright holders to receive all the necessary details for
further proceedings.268 A cease-and-desist letter typically follows this
injunction.269 Right holders have also effectively initiated civil or
criminal court proceedings against individuals primarily to stop
infringement, rather than to obtain damages.270 Regarding injunctions
against intermediaries, Swedish courts issued in 2017 and 2018 the
first injunctions ordering ISPs to block its customers’ access to a
number of IP and http addresses (proxy and mirror sites) relating to
The Pirate Bay, as well as other unauthorized streaming websites. 271
Despite that, it was noted that Swedish law requires at least a showing
of contributory infringement—except for information injunctions—
which, combined with the absence of more specific rules beyond safe
harbors, arguably disincentives ISPs from developing common codes
of conduct for NTD procedures.272
Finally, in the UK, injunctions against service providers under
Section 97A CDPA are widely used: more than 500 injunctions were
265. Id. at 166.
266. Id. at 168.
267. Id. at 165.
268. Id. at 185, 191.
269. Id. at 191-92.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 192–93.
272. See id. at 190; Kacper Szkalej, Blocking Injunctions Against ISPs in Sweden
2.0 beta – The Rise of the Interim Injunction? (Part 1), KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG
(Nov. 22, 2018), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/11/22/blocking-
injunctions-against-isps-in-sweden-2-0-beta-the-rise-of-the-interim-injunction-
part-1/; Kacper Szkalej, Blocking Injunctions Against ISPs in Sweden 2.0 beta – The
Rise of the Interim Injunction? (Part 2), KLUWERCOPYRIGHTBLOG (Nov. 26, 2018),
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/11/26/blocking-injunctions-against-
isps-in-sweden-2-0-beta-the-rise-of-the-interim-injunction-part-2/.
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granted according to 2015 numbers.273 Most of the case law in this
respect has concerned blocking injunctions, such as against
unauthorized sports live streaming websites and websites like Popcorn
Time.274
Outside Europe, in Brazil, the most effective measures are those
carried out directly against intermediaries as private enforcement,
such as the sending of out-of-court notifications and in general the
judicially created NTD system.275 In the current judicial interpretation
of the law, an ISP can be held secondarily liable if it does not make a
URL to infringing material inaccessible after being notified by the
interested party.276 In Canada, the most common measures are
infringement notices sent by right holders via intermediaries through
the notice-and-notice system or (less frequently) by way of a Norwich
order.277 Canadian copyright holders have reportedly sent millions of
notices since the law came into force in early 2015.278 Conversely,
copyright holders have not launched many civil infringement and anti-
circumvention proceedings against users and intermediaries. 279
Finally, it is worth noting the current and controversial discussion in
Canada on the possible implementation of a copyright web-blocking
mechanism, to be managed by an independent third-party agency (the
proposed Internet Piracy Review Agency), enforced by the Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, and
operating under the Telecommunications Act. As of writing, no
decision regarding its implementation has been made.280
Turning to Asia, in Hong Kong, the most widely used private
enforcement measures are takedown notices issued to local and
foreign online intermediaries, and infringement notices issued to
273. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 201, 212.
274. Id. at 205.
275. Id. at 231.
276. Id. at 223, 237, 231.
277. Id. at 244-45.
278. Id. at 245.
279. Id. at 246.
280. Id. at 248; see also Michael Geist, The Case Against the Bell Coalition’s
Website Blocking Plan, The Finale, MICHAEL GEIST (Mar. 8, 2018),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/03/caseagainstsiteblockingfinale/ (with extensive
coverage on this topic including an analysis of the Bell Coalition’s Website Blocking
Plan).
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alleged infringers.281 From the perspective of public enforcement, the
most common measure is reporting to (or cooperating with) the
Customs and Excise Department, which inter alia monitors popular
online forums to track and arrest users uploading infringing content.282
In Indonesia, it is common to tackle copyright infringement through
the filing of criminal complaints.283 Also noteworthy are the
administrative provisions that allow for the possibility of closing a
website following reporting of an infringement to an ISP, a new
governmental antipiracy task force created for the purpose of shutting
down infringing websites, as well as a new “infringing website list”
identifying popular piracy websites and encouraging advertisers to
remove their ads therefrom.284
In Japan, there is significant litigation involving information
injunctions under the regime of the ISP Liability Limitation Act.285 In
addition, the Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters published in
April 2018 the emergency plan against copyright infringing websites,
encouraging ISPs to conduct a site-blocking under certain conditions
and announcing the establishment of a legal system for enabling such
site-blocking by ISPs.286 Finally, in Thailand, the most widely used
enforcement practice is public criminal enforcement by police
281. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 257–58.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 270.
284. Id. at 260, 272; see also Ari Gema, Intellectual Property Rights: Indonesia
Can Win the War on Online Piracy, JAKARTA POST, (May 3, 2018, 2:49 PM),
https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/05/03/intellectual-property-rights-
indonesia-can-win-the-war-on-online-piracy.html (“Since 2015, an interagency
antipiracy task force within the government has shut down 392 illegal film websites
that distribute or stream pirated content. . . . We are also going directly to advertisers.
Last October, an Infringing Website List was launched by several industry
associations . . . with the support of the Creative Economy Agency (Bekraf), to
make companies aware of which sites they should not place ads on.”).
285. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 276, 279.
286. Id. at 280; see also Andy, Japan Government Presents Pirate Website
Blocking Proposals, TORRENT FREAK (Sept. 18, 2018), https://torrentfreak.com/
japan-government-presents-pirate-website-blocking-proposals-180918/ (noting that
the proposals aremotivated by specific concerns with the piracy of manga and anime
content, and the Government has gone as far as implementing interim “emergency
measures to prevent access to websites hosting pirated manga, anime and other
content”).
2019] THEDECLINE OFONLINE PIRACY 863
authorities.287 Also common are direct warnings for the removal of
infringing content, a private enforcement practice taking place before
the start of a criminal procedure.288 Finally, Thailand has a new Anti-
Piracy Agency created with the aim to speed-up and streamline the
legal process leading to website blocking.289
D. CONCLUSIONS OF THE LEGALANALYSIS
Our comparative legal research on the legal status of online
copyright infringement and enforcement in the thirteen countries
studied found that, despite some legal uncertainty, the majority of acts
studied are qualified as direct copyright infringement by users or give
rise to liability for intermediaries. Moreover, ISPs are often subject to
injunctions and duties of care even when they benefit from safe
harbors.290On the whole, copyright holders have a vast arsenal of legal
enforcement measures to deploy against end users and ISPs. There is
a trend in many countries toward copyright enforcement through civil
or administrative measures aimed at blocking websites that provide
access to infringing content.291 Notices to infringers and to platforms
hosting or linking to infringing content with the aim of removing or
blocking such content are likewise regularly used, the latter in the
context of notice-and-takedown systems. Criminal measures are less
popular.
Still, despite the abundance of enforcement measures, their
perceived effectiveness is uncertain. Therefore, it is questionable
whether the answer to successfully tackling online copyright
infringement lies in additional rights or enforcement measures,
287. QUINTAIS, GLOBAL ONLINE PIRACY STUDY LEGAL BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 22, 90.
288. Id. at 22.
289. See Andy, Netflix Quick to File Complaint with New Thai Anti-Piracy
Agency, TORRENT FREAK (Dec. 19, 2018), https://torrentfreak.com/netflix-quick-to-
file-complaint-with-new-thai-anti-piracy-agency-181219/.
290. See MARTIN HUSOVEC, INJUNCTIONS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: ACCOUNTABLE BUT NOT LIABLE? 104–11 (2017) (considering
this to the be in the EU a form of “accountability,” rather than liability).
291. See Andy, MPA Reveals Scale of Worldwide Pirate Site Blocking, TORRENT
FREAK (Apr. 10, 2018), https://torrentfreak.com/mpa-reveals-scale-of-worldwide-
pirate-site-blocking-180410/ (according to information from the Motion Picture
Association Canada, at least 42 countries are currently blocking infringing websites,
and in Europe alone, 1.800 websites and 5.300 domains have been blocked).
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especially if these will not lead to additional revenue for copyright
holders and risk coming into conflict with fundamental rights of users
and intermediaries. Instead, it might be sensible to search for the
answer to piracy elsewhere—in the provision of affordable and
convenient legal access to copyright-protected content.
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
At the outset of this article we stressed the intricate relation between
online piracy and legal sales. Positive, neutral and negative
interactions exist and their relevance is likely to vary between content
types, distribution channels, over time, and between blockbusters and
niche content.292 Moreover, empirical research to establish any such
relation is met with methodological challenges that are difficult to
resolve: at an individual level, legal consumption and piracy typically
go hand in hand. This is illustrated in our research by the demographic
description of pirates and legal users, who are very much alike.
Moreover, because of underlying individual preferences, pirates are
much more likely to be legal users of each content type than are non-
pirates, and the median legal consumption of pirates is typically twice
that of non-pirates. As such, a positive correlation between piracy and
legal consumption can be expected. But this should not be hastily
interpreted as a causal relationship. Against this background, this Part
of the article discusses the empirical findings of our study, based on
sales data and data from our consumer survey that targeted nearly
35.000 respondents.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL SALES
How have legal sales developed across the countries studied? To
answer this question, we have examined sales data for music, film and
video, books and games. Our research finds that across all content
types and formats, per capita income is an important driver of per
capita expenditure. That is to say, how much money people make
greatly affects how much they spend on cultural content. However,
this is only true up to a point: above an annual income level of €30.000
per capita, this relationship no longer seems to apply and national
preferences dominate income effects. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
292. See supra Part II.A.
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Figure 1 Legal content sales and income data293
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Focusing on sales per content type, it is evident that physical sales
are consistently declining for almost every content type and in almost
every country studied, particularly for audio-visual content. Print
books still dominate in all countries and books are relatively resistant
to digitization. Digital sales have grown almost everywhere over the
past three years. For music, digital streaming grew strongly at the
expense of digital downloads. For audio-visual content, SVOD
services such as Netflix are becoming the dominant model.294
Despite the physical sales decline, the increase in digital sales led
to net growth for total recorded music, audio-visual content, books and
games between 2014 and 2017. Expenditures on live concerts and
cinema visits are growing almost everywhere. In the music category,
live concerts generate revenues comparable to those for recorded
music, except in Japan. In the audio-visual category, cinemas generate
not much less revenue than physical and digital recorded content
combined.295
B. MAIN SURVEY FINDINGS
Our consumer survey was completed by a total of 34.673
respondents, between 2.640 and 2.750 per country, for the thirteen
countries studied here. A total of 4.352 respondents from seven
European countries were approached with similar surveys in 2012 (the
Netherlands) and the other six countries (2014), which implies that
294. Id. at 11, 36.
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they can be followed over time. The survey was carried out meeting
state of the art methodological requirements as regards sample
composition and recruitment, representativeness and weighing, and
data cleaning.296 In this section we provide an overview of the survey’s
main outcomes.
The aim of the consumer survey was to provide information about
the use of authorized and unauthorized channels for the acquisition
and consumption of content, and to assess underlying mechanisms and
the effect of online piracy on consumption from legal channels.
The survey demonstrates that consumption of music and its
acquisition from illegal channels is most common in Spain, where
35% of the total population engaged in such activity in 2017, and least
common in Japan, where only 9% did so. However, differences in the
legal framework do not seem to play a role here, because downloading
is illegal in both countries and both Spain and Japan have enforcement
measures. Relative to the Internet population, music piracy is most
common in Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil. Between 2014 and 2017.
The number of music pirates decreased in each of the European
countries for which two measurements are available. The percentage
of the population pirating films and series also decreased in each of
these countries. For the number of book pirates, the trend in all
European countries is again downward, and the same is found for
games, except for a slight increase in Germany.
The percentages of the population consuming any of these content
types via any legal or illegal channel are summarized, respectively, in
Figure 2 and Figure 3. Figure 2 excludes live concerts and
merchandise, but includes offline legal consumption on physical
carriers. The percentage of legal content consumers per country ranges
from 61% (France) to 93% (Indonesia). This percentage declined
somewhat between 2014 and 2017 in most European countries, mainly
due to a decrease for physical carriers, whereas total sales volumes
increased.
296. Id. at 43-44.
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Figure 2 Acquired or accessed any content type legally (last year)297
Figure 3, shows that online piracy (excluding stream-ripping) is
most prevalent in the Internet populations of Indonesia, Thailand, and
Brazil, followed by Spain and Poland. As a percentage of the total
population (not depicted), Spain, Canada, and Hong Kong are the top
three countries for piracy, whereas online piracy is the least common
in Germany and Japan. Except in Germany, the percentage of pirates
decreased in all European countries. For the countries in this study
outside Europe, this cannot be determined as no previous
measurement using the same methodology is available.
297. Exclusive of radio, linear television, live concerts and merchandise;
inclusive of offline consumption from legal sources. Id. at 13.
FRA DEU NLD POL ESP SWE GBR BRA CAN HKG IDN JPN THA
2014 (% of Int. pop.) 68% 82% 84% 84% 78% 84%












2019] THEDECLINE OFONLINE PIRACY 869
Figure 3 Acquired or accessed any content type illegally (last year)298
The per capita consumption volumes per legal and illegal content
channel that follow from the survey do not always match these
developments. In most European countries, there is a trend of
decreasing volumes for physical carriers, at least for music and audio-
visual content, not for games and books, despite a declining
percentage of users of physical formats for all. Similarly, for most
European countries and for most content types, there is an increase in
the per capita volume of illegal content consumption, in spite of a
decreasing percentage of the population engaging in online piracy.
This implies that piracy is gradually becoming restricted to a smaller
group, although its total volume is not decreasing: fewer people
consume more on aggregate via illegal channels.
However, the groups in Figure 2 and Figure 3 overlap: in terms of
demographics, pirates are very similar to legal users, although on
average they tend to be somewhat younger and more often male. 299
Most importantly, 95% or more of pirates also consume content
legally and their median legal consumption is typically twice that of
298. Exclusive of stream-ripping and pirated copies on physical carriers. Id.
299. See, e.g., Joan-Josep Vallbé et al., Knocking on Heaven’s Door - User
Preferences on Digital Cultural Distribution (Forthcoming Internet Policy Review
2019) (providing a conclusion that is similar to those reached in other studies).
FRA DEU NLD POL ESP SWE GBR BRA CAN HKG IDN JPN THA
2014 (% of Int. pop.) 45% 28% 69% 71% 47% 38%
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non-pirating legal users, for each content type and country. As such,
the group of pirates in Figure 3 includes mostly people who also use
legal channels, and the group of legal users in Figure 2 includes many
people who also pirate content sometimes.
The ratio between the percentages of people who have used illegal
channels compared to people who have used legal channels at least
once in 2017 (and, if available, in 2014) is lowest in Japan and
Germany, where there is about one user of illegal channels for any
three users of legal channels. In Thailand and Indonesia, both groups
are almost equally large. This metric, reconfirms the earlier
observation that the percentage of the population engaging in online
piracy is declining in most of Europe. It might be tempting to argue
that an increase in the use of certain enforcement measures against
obviously illegal platforms (e.g., Pirate Bay) contributed to the
decreasing number of pirates in Europe. However, a lack of evidence
concerning the effectiveness of most enforcement measures and the
strong link between piracy and the availability and affordability of
content suggests otherwise.
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Figure 4 Pirates per legal content user vs. per capita income (in constant
prices)300
Figure 4 shows the number of pirates per legal user against per
capita income. At a country level, online piracy is strongly linked to a
lack of purchasing power. Higher per capita income correlates with a
lower number of pirates per legal users. In countries above the line,
there are more users of illegal sources per legal user than what is
expected from the average income level. Notably, Spain is above the
line, in spite of the extensive and increasing assortment of enforcement
measures available against infringing users and intermediaries in its
law. In Japan and Germany, countries below the line, there are less
pirates per legal user than would be expected based on per capita
income. Arrows show the development that countries have made
between 2014 and 2017. Generally, this development has been along
or towards the trend line. This implies that, as a rule, changes in piracy
levels are best understood by pointing to changes in welfare, rather
than enforcement.
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C. SHALL I BUY OR SHALL I PIRATE? THE DISPLACEMENT OF
LEGAL SALES
How does online piracy affect legal consumption? As said,
correlation does not establish a causal relationship and a time series
analysis does not differentiate between the effects of piracy and
changes in preferences or in legal supply. To estimate this
displacement effect, the article will first look at the number of content
units per consumption channel that are reported in the survey, using
an instrumental variable regression. Second, it analyzes survey
questions in which respondents indicated which blockbuster films for
the years 2015 to 2017 they had seen and how. Third, it combines the
responses in the survey with those in a similar survey in 2014, and
analyzes individual changes in consumption for the respondents who
participated in both: a panel study.301
Following the first approach, Table 2 provides statistical evidence
that illegal consumption of music, books and games displaces legal
consumption. However, the estimations are surrounded with
substantial uncertainty: the 95% confidence interval for the
displacement for music ranges from –0.06 to –1.23. With regards to
books and games, in particular, the range is large, which may be
related to the fact that underlying these content types is a wider variety
of actual works. More than likely people who download games from
illegal channels are not interested in simpler free online games. In
addition, separating the results between adults and minors implies that
displacement occurs for adults but not for minors.
Table 2 Instrumental Variable estimation of displacement rates per content
type302
Music Audio-visual Books Games
Displacement rate –0.65** –0.136 –1.195** –1.963*
Standard error 0.30 0.301 0.580 1.029
95% confidence interval –1.23 ~ –0.06 –0.73 ~ 0.45 –2.33 ~ –0.06 –3.98 ~ 0.05
N 14,712 16,289 11,878 10,567
Note: symbols *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at a 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level, respectively. Music excluding
live concerts.
301. Id. at 43–46.
302. Id. at 15.
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When breaking down the results from Table 2, the results for music
suggest that illegal consumption primarily displaces legal downloads
and physical carriers. The effect on streaming is not statistically
significant. For live concerts and music festivals, the effect is positive.
This goes with the notion that digital recorded music is not a substitute
for live music but a complement and that this interaction benefits from
the sampling effect.
For audio-visual content, there is no sampling for cinema visits,
which is statistically significantly displaced, and the same holds for
digital streams, while no significant effects are found for physical
purchases and digital downloads. For rentals, there is a marginally
significant positive coefficient, which would demonstrate that illegal
consumption of audio-visual content promotes (what is left of)
physical rentals. Rentals (including from libraries) concern older
audio-visual content, which may benefit from a sampling effect.
With regards to books, the results contrast those for music and
audio-visual; there are large and statistically significant displacement
rates for books bought in print (or as audiobooks on a physical carrier)
and borrowed from the library. Against the backdrop of a much
smaller and statistically insignificant estimate for e-book downloads
from legal sources (the more likely substitute for illegal downloads),
these displacement rates may be overstated by capturing the effect of
some people who have shifted from consuming print books to digital
and others who have not.
With regards to games, the displacement rate for free games is
particularly high, but the coefficients found for the other channels are
also statistically significant. Similar to books, the large coefficient for
free games may be overstated by a partial division between consumers
who primarily play free games, and pirates who are more dedicated
‘gamers’, that prefer console games.
Using time-structured data for blockbuster films, there is an average
displacement rate of –0.46 of first legal views by first illegal views.
Particularly, for each two first illegal views of blockbuster films, a
little less than one first legal view was displaced. This effect is smaller
in Japan and the Netherlands and larger in Thailand and Brazil. In
combination with a positive sampling effect on second legal views and
taking various robustness checks into account, the aggregate
displacement effect for blockbuster films is between –0.20 and –0.45.
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Put differently, on average 100 illegal views lead to twenty to forty-
five fewer legal views.
This relates to blockbuster films, for which larger displacement can
be expected than for niche content and older content. Moreover, it
refers to audio-visual content, which most people consume only once
or twice. Subsequently, the bandwidth is a plausible upper bound for
overall displacement in the other content types. An analysis per
channel reveals that most of the displacement occurs for cinema visits.
Displacement rates for later windows are smaller.
From these estimations, calculating an upper bound for the
comparative sales loss of total film views per channel and per country
is possible. Generally, a maximum of around 4.1% of all legal
blockbuster views is displaced by illegal views. In essence, about 4%
of the would-be legal views if there were no piracy, did not occur
because of it. For specific channels, this varies from 3.2% for TV to
4.5% for legal streams and downloads. Per country, it ranges from
0.3% in Japan to 10.3% in Thailand.
Consolidating the survey data with data from a similar survey in
2014, targeting the same respondents to the extent possible, allows for
an analysis of individual changes in consumption in six EU countries
over time. It demonstrates positive and statistically significant
correlations for each content type. Thus, an increase in illegal
consumption over time correlates with an increase in legal
consumption and vice versa. Seemingly, substitution effects—‘Shall I
buy or shall I pirate?’—occur on the spot. Over time, there have been
improvements in the availability from legal channels and changes in
personal preferences that affect legal and illegal consumption alike: in
essence, if one increases or decreases, the other does so as well,
leading to a positive correlation at an individual level.
V. CONCLUSION
This article examined the use of legal and illegal channels for the
acquisition and consumption of copyright-protected content through
legal and empirical research in thirteen countries and regions around
the world: France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, and
Thailand. The types of content studied are music, films, series, books
and games. Our empirical findings are based on consumer surveys of
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35.000 respondents in the mentioned thirteen countries.
Comparative legal research shows that despite some legal
uncertainty, most types of online use studied—downloading and
streaming from illegal sources (including via dedicated technical
devices), and stream-ripping—qualify as direct copyright
infringement by users or give rise to liability for intermediaries. ISPs
are frequently subject to injunctions and duties of care even when they
benefit from safe harbors. Therefore, copyright holders have at their
disposal a vast array of enforcement measures against end users and
intermediaries to tackle infringement. At this stage, the most
commonly used measures include the blocking of access to infringing
websites, and the use of notices to infringers and platforms hosting or
linking to infringing content with the aim of removing or blocking
such content.
Our analysis reveals that the effectiveness of copyright enforcement
measures is questionable, casting doubt on whether it holds the key to
drive down piracy. This is especially true where enforcement
measures fail to translate into additional revenue, or risk conflicting
with fundamental rights of users and intermediaries. The answer to
piracy, it appears, lies beyond the law. Most likely, it is to be found in
markets.
Markets for copyright-protected content are growing. The increase
in digital sales led to net growth for total recorded music, audio-visual
content, books, and games between 2014 and 2017 in the majority of
countries studied, despite a decline in physical sales. Expenditures on
live concerts and cinema visits are also increasing. Furthermore, sales
data show that across all content types and formats, per capita income
is an important driver of expenditures, at least until an annual income
level of € 30.000 per capita: how much money people make greatly
affects how much they spend on cultural content.
Our surveys show that between 2014 and 2017, the number of
pirates decreased in all European countries except Germany. In
addition, online piracy is most prevalent in the internet populations of
Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil, followed by Spain and Poland. As a
percentage of total population, Spain, Canada, and Hong Kong are the
top three countries for piracy.
There is lack of evidence concerning the effectiveness of most
enforcement measures to suggest that an increase in the use of certain
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enforcement measures against obviously illegal platforms has
contributed to the decreasing number of pirates in Europe. The strong
link between piracy and the availability and affordability of content
actually suggests otherwise: at a country level, online piracy correlates
remarkably strongly with a lack of purchasing power. Higher per
capita income coincides with a lower number of pirates per legal users.
Moreover, pirates are also legal users. Demographically, pirates
resemble legal users quite closely, although on average they tend to be
somewhat younger and more often male. Significantly, 95% or more
of pirates also consume content legally and their median legal
consumption is typically twice that of non-pirating legal users.
Regarding sales displacement, our research finds statistical
evidence that illegal consumption of music, books, and games
displaces legal consumption. For live concerts and music festivals,
however, there is a positive effect. Illegal consumption of blockbuster
films, which can be expected to lead to higher displacement rates than
niche content and for instance music, is found to replace legal
consumption at a rate of less than one half. This implies that for every
two illegal blockbuster views, less than one legal view is displaced.
Taking overall piracy rates into account, this translates into a sales loss
of about 4%. At an individual level, changes over time in the
availability of legal supply, in personal preferences, and economic
welfare are found to trump outright displacement of legal sales by
piracy.
The main takeaway from our research is that online piracy is
declining. The key driver for this decline is the increasing availability
of affordable legal content, rather than enforcement measures. Where
the legal supply of content is affordable, convenient and diverse, there
is increasing consumer demand for it. Under the right conditions,
consumers are willing to pay for copyright-protected content and to
abandon piracy. The crucial policy implication here is that policy
makers should focus their resources and legislative efforts on
improving those conditions. In particular, they ought to shift their
focus from repressive approaches to tackle online infringement
towards policies and measures that foster lawful remunerated access
to copyright-protected content.
